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1 Introduction 
 
“Not too long ago, Argentina was better known for fascist-style militarism (since the 1930s), 
dirty wars (until the 1970s), a pointless war (against England in the early 1980s), reckless 
macroeconomics and presidential crises (until the 2000s), institutional disarray and crazy pop-
ulism (to this day), and one of the most heterosexual and gender-stereotypical dances in the 
world (the tango).”  
(Corrales & Pecheny, 2010) 
 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage in Argentina in 2010 failed to match our assumptions about Ma-
chismo and heteronormativity in the country. Two years after being the first country in Latin America 
that opened the institution of marriage for same-sex couples on the national level, the Argentine parlia-
ment passed ground-breaking legislation on legal gender recognition (LGR), allowing trans1 and intersex 
people to change their legal gender on official documents such as birth certificates and passports. A legal 
gender change in Argentina is now easier than anywhere else in the world. It is a mere administrative act, 
without the involvement of court decisions or invasive requirements such as having to undergo sex change 
surgery. Why out of all countries does Argentina grant such far reaching sexual rights to LGBT (Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans) people? 
South Africa is another country that surprises with permissive sexual rights policies. In 1994, South Africa 
legalised abortion on demand. In 2003, the South African parliament passed a law regulating the legal 
recognition of gender changes. And finally, in 2006, South Africa was the first (and, at the time of writing, 
remains the only) country on the African continent to legalise gay marriage. How do these policies fit with 
the high incidence of homophobic violence and “corrective rape”, i.e. the rape of a lesbian to “cure” her 
homosexuality, faced by LGBT people in South Africa (Thoreson, 2008, pp. 694–695; Thoreson, 2013)? 
 
                                                     
1 The word “trans” is used as an umbrella term for various identities in the trans spectrum. In other words,  identities that do 
not confirm to the male/female binary, such as transsexual, transgender, trans-identified, transvestite, gender non-conforming, 
intersex, gender-fluid, gender-queer, etc. 
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This dissertation aims to explain the surprising regulations of abortion, same-sex marriage and legal gender 
recognition (LGR) in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina. The primary argument brought for-
ward in this study is that the overall permissive pattern of what I will refer to as sexual rights policy in 
South Africa and Argentina is a result of the legacy of what I will term an ideological symbiosis between 
both state and church2, during Argentina’s last military dictatorship (1976 until democratisation in 1983) 
and the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948 until 1994). This is the case because the church’s associa-
tion with these authoritarian regimes creates unfavourable political opportunity structures for their post-
democratic era access to the policy process. Concurrently, these post-authoritarian contexts create fa-
vourable conditions for policy influence by social movements, who employ human rights framings for 
their claims to gain support by democratic politicians for sexual rights policy passage. 
What South Africa and Argentina have in common is that they are two countries of the global South that 
underwent regime transition during what is known as the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 
1991b). Argentina (re)-democratised in 1984 after seven years under a violently repressive military dic-
tatorship. South Africa held its first non-racial democratic elections in 1994, after half a century of rule by 
the racist apartheid regime. During both authoritarian regimes, the merging of nationalism and Christian-
ity delivered the ideological legitimation of authoritarian rule. The traditionally high societal importance 
of churches went hand in hand with a high political importance of religious institutions during authoritar-
ianism. The Catholic Church in Argentina and the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa had close 
ideological ties to the authoritarian state, informing public policy decisions and doctrinally justifying hu-
man rights abuses, such as political murder and torture in Argentina and the policy of “separate develop-
ment” (apartheid in Afrikaans) in South Africa. However, state/church relations were to transform funda-
mentally during democratisation. Churches associated with the former regimes were blocked from ac-
cessing secularised democratic politics. 
Sexual rights policies in South Africa and Argentina are surprising on various levels. Perhaps due to the 
discursive conflation between permissive women’s and LGBT rights regulations, modernity and Western-
ness, South Africa’s and Argentina’s location in the Southern Hemisphere has led many to overlook their 
anomalous regulatory paths. Anecdotal references about cultural machismo and sexism but also reports 
on the grim reality faced by women and LGBT people in both countries contributes to an impression of 
misfit between the far-reaching legal protection of sexual rights and the reality of South African and Ar-
gentine societies. 
                                                     
2 When I use the term “church“, I mean to designate the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Christian churches, not the entirety of its 
adherents. 
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Scholarship on religious influence on policy output argues that the religious stratification of society shapes 
the restrictiveness or permissiveness of policies regulating issues that touch upon fundamental societal 
norms and values (Budde, Knill, Fernandez-i-Marin, & Preidel, 2017; Castles, 1994; Minkenberg, 2002). 
On a theoretical level we would expect the societal importance of Catholicism in Argentina and the reli-
gious devoutness of South Africa’s population to mobilise voters and strengthen churches’ bargaining po-
sitions to shape policy output according to religious doctrine. Yet, South Africa and Argentina have passed 
permissive sexual rights policies against the doctrinal preferences of and protest by their respective 
churches. Thus, from the perspective of existing theories of religious influence on policy output, South 
Africa and Argentina represent deviant cases.   
The explanation I offer for the failure of religious influence to prevent permissive sexual rights policy 
passage in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina is macro-historical in that it explores the past as 
the history of South Africa and Argentina’s present. This present is “post-authoritarian” in that both coun-
tries’ current constitutional identities are shaped by the experience of authoritarianism. “The broad un-
derstanding of how past and present relations are constructed and preserved is reflected in the conception 
and usage of the term ‘post’. Postcolonial, post-apartheid and post-liberation are all terms that define an 
historical period in contraposition to the previous one.” (Bompani 2006, S. 1139)  
Democratic South African and Argentine politics are a collective response to their respective authoritarian 
past. The political cleavage between authoritarianism and democracy marks the boundaries between two 
historical periods and the association with one of the two shapes the positioning of political players and 
arguments as either legitimate or illegitimate participants in the political discourse on sexual rights policy. 
In that way the ideological endorsement of authoritarian regimes by religious institutions would later dis-
qualify religious doctrine as a source of guiding principles for sexual rights policies. At the same time, the 
regime transition during the international normative context of third wave democratisation made human 
rights a readily available frame for social movements to claim sexual rights. When framed as human rights, 
permissive regulations proposed by women’s and LGBT rights movements gained support by policy makers. 
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1.1 Existing Explanations for Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage and LGR Policy Output 
Comparative morality policy scholarship and literature on religion and politics offer potential explanations 
for sexual rights policy output. Morality policy research is a growing branch of scholarship on the public 
regulation of issues which touch upon fundamental societal and often religious values. Abortion, same-sex 
marriage and LGR), or sexual rights policies, belong to some of the quintessential morality policies because 
they touch upon deep rooted societal constructs of gender, sexuality and the role of religious doctrine. 
Scholars in the field have argued that the religious stratification of society matters for morality policy 
output. Castles (1994; Castles, 1998; 1998, 1998) and Minkenberg (2002), for instance, have argued that 
Catholic countries in Western Europe regulate more restrictively than Protestant ones. Furthermore, 
Minkenberg (2002) has used the degree of religiosity of the population, measured as church attendance 
rates, as a proxy for conservative values held by the population. In the US-American context, scholars 
have linked adherence rates to evangelical Protestantism within a state with morality policy restrictiveness 
(Scheitle & Hahn, 2011).  
After decades of the domination of secularisation and modernisation theory in the social sciences (predict-
ing the disappearance of religion as societies modernise), we must credit morality policy scholarship for 
contributing to our understanding that religion still matters for political phenomena. However, when it 
comes to the theorisation of the causal pathways of religious influence and religious non-influence, we 
only stand at the beginning.  
Recent case studies have complemented structural explanations by stressing that the informal relationship 
between state and church is a decisive factor in accounting for religious influence on sexual rights policies 
and related issues such as divorce. For instance, Hennig (2012) argues a historically grown pattern of 
cooperation between state and church to belong to the conditions for church influence on policy output.  
Grzymala-Busse (2015) contends that the opposition of churches to foreign hostile regimes, such as the 
cases for the Catholic Church in Poland during Communism or Chile during the military dictatorship 
under Pinochet, led to a fusion of political and religious identities. The causal mechanism Grzymala-Busse 
suggests leads from the church defending the nation to high moral authority of churches after regime 
change that can be used to gain institutional access to politics. Her argument is aimed at explaining why 
and how churches can gain institutional access to the political system and shape policy output. For the 
opposite scenario, that is when churches oppose democracy, Grzymala-Busse (2015, p. 13) simply diag-
noses “no mechanism of influence”. 
What remains undertheorised is exactly how churches are blocked from exerting policy influence and how 
this produces permissive sexual rights policies. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by proposing a causal 
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mechanism that can explain why permissive sexual rights policies were passed in South Africa and Argen-
tina, despite the opposition of historically powerful religious institutions.  
Building on Grzymala-Busse’s insight that moral authority of churches is a brittle resource that can be in 
vain if churches do not conduct themselves according to their own moral standards and on Htun (2003, 
p. 6) and Grzymala-Busse’s (2015, p. 39, 47) remarks that support for authoritarian regimes can lead to 
a loss of moral authority of churches, I theorise a causal mechanism that connects an ideological fusion of 
church and state during authoritarianism with sexual rights policy output after democratisation. I expand 
on existing explanations by fleshing out the causal connection between state/church ideological symbiosis 
and permissive policy output and adding social movements as the pivotal counterparts to religious institu-
tions in trying to shape sexual rights policy output to the explanation.  
 
1.2 The threefold Research Question 
Chile and Poland have received considerable scholarly attention as the prime cases of religious influence 
on morality policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015a; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003). Neither of the two countries 
has legalised same-sex marriage, LGR, or abortion. A common characteristic of the religious landscape of 
Chile, Poland, Argentina and South Africa is that all four have religious institutions espousing conservative 
moral views. For specificity, that are the respective national Catholic Churches in the former three coun-
tries, and the Dutch Reformed Church and a multitude of smaller evangelical Protestant churches in South 
Africa. Religion holds a large societal importance in all four countries, yet religious institutions in South 
Africa and Argentina were unsuccessful in their attempts to prevent permissive sexual rights policy passage 
after democratisation.  
Three aspects of South African and Argentine sexual rights policies are peculiar. First, the permissiveness of 
their regulatory approaches compared to Poland and Chile’s restrictive regulations. Second, these two coun-
tries have opted for unusual regulatory trajectories. When parliaments in South Africa and Argentina passed 
abortion laws and LGBT rights policy, they did so from relatively restrictive status quos and went towards 
very permissive regulatory approaches. Both countries have legalised gay marriage without the additional 
preliminary step of passing a partnership regime. Apart from Spain and Portugal, most other European coun-
tries have progressed from partnership regimes with fewer rights than marriage to gay marriage. Third, 
Argentina’s restrictive abortion regulation stands in stark contrast to its LGBT rights policies, which deviates 
from a standard pattern of rights succession in Europe which moves from abortion policy change decades 
before LGBT rights policies were passed. 
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1.3 Research Approach 
The overall logic of this dissertation is a comparative case study, tracing the causal mechanism connecting 
the state/church ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule with sexual rights policy output after de-
mocratisation. South Africa and Argentina not only represent enormously interesting and under re-
searched cases, but they are also deviant cases from the perspective of theories on religious influence on 
public policy. A deviant case is a case “that, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either 
a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value [outcome]” (Gerring, 2007, p. 105). 
A deviant case selection strategy is particularly useful for refining existing theories (Levy, 2008, p. 3) as 
by explaining why those cases deviate from theoretical predictions, researchers are enabled to modify and 
refine theory or specify its scope conditions (ibid., p. 5, 8).  
Theory-testing process tracing is a method of enquiry for the assessment of the presence of a hypothesised 
causal mechanism. Process tracing goes beyond the co-occurrence of two phenomena and enables the 
researcher to establish whether there is indeed a causal connection between them within a single case 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 165). Tracing the unfolding of the causal process in South Africa and Argen-
tina, two cases that are geographically and politically independent from each other, adds a valuable com-
parative element to process tracing. The mechanistic understanding of causality that underlies process 
tracing demands for set-theoretical causal propositions, i.e. meaning the theoretical claim is limited to a 
specific set of cases.  
The causal mechanism I propose is set-theoretical, meaning that it “seeks to uncover middle-range theories 
formulated as a causal mechanism that works within a bounded context, .i.e. spatially or temporally” 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 60). Considering this, three criteria must be fulfilled in order to belong to 
this set of cases. First, countries must display a religious stratification of society that would lead us to 
expect religious influence on policy, but which nevertheless pass permissive sexual rights policies. Second, 
countries must have a clearly identifiable historical pattern of state/church ideological symbiosis during 
their previous authoritarian regime. Third, these countries must have democratised during what is known 
as the third wave of democratisation (from the 1970s onwards).  
The regime change is an important scope condition for the mechanism because it represents a powerful rupture 
in path dependent processes and spawns new constitutional identities and power relations. Indeed the timing of 
the regime change is also relevant because third-wave democratisations take place in a particular international 
normative environment. This context involves the growing in density and importance of international law and the 
evolution of the international human rights regime to increasingly include gender and sexuality as human rights 
issues (Rebouche, 2011, p. 12). Apart from South Africa and Argentina, Spain and Portugal fulfil these criteria 
and the explanatory relevance of the causal mechanism for those cases will be discussed in the conclusion.  
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To solve the threefold research question, we will proceed as follows: Chapter two will examine sexual 
rights policies in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile. We will find that prominent theories in mo-
rality policy literature cannot explain why South Africa and Argentina regulate sexual rights policies per-
missively, and not as restrictively as Poland and Chile do. The third chapter contains the conceptualisation 
of each step of the causal mechanism of religious blockade, and empirical tests for the tracing of this process 
in South Africa and Argentina.  
Chapters four through seven constitute the empirical investigation and each chapter reviews an element 
of the causal chain, chronologically tracing the causal process that led from the historical state/church 
symbiosis in South Africa and Argentina to the permissive policy output of the present. More specifically, 
chapter four examines the causal condition, how the state/church ideological symbiosis manifested itself 
in apartheid South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina. The fifth chapter investigates the 
effects of the past-alliance structures for the democratic constitutional identities that develop after regime 
change. The sixth chapter looks at social movements and analyses the different opportunity structures of 
interest groups in the abortion and LGBT rights policy processes. In chapter seven we will see how the 
former components of the causal chain relate to political decision making in debates on sexual rights pol-
icies in the present era. It will be shown that the strategic human rights framing by social movements 
created a rhetorical trap for politicians such that opposing policy reform would equal betrayal of the dem-
ocratic constitutional identities.  
The eighth and final chapter concludes by highlighting the key findings for solving the research puzzle 
and discusses the implications of this study for morality policy scholarship, literature on religion and 
politics and secularisation theory more generally. This study closes by critically exploring the real world 
relevance of permissive sexual rights policies when they are embedded in conservative societies with 
high levels of inequality. 
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2 Surprising Patterns of Sexual Rights Policy Output  
 
In recent years we have witnessed a remarkable increase in scholarship on morality policies. Such policies 
reflect a conflict about first principles, touching upon fundamental societal values (Knill, 2013, p. 309; 
Mooney, 1999, p. 675). While studies on morality policy have diverse research interests, such as the 
categorisation of morality policy as its own type of policy (Hurka, Adam, & Knill, 2016; Mooney & 
Schuldt, 2008; Studlar, Cagossi, & Duval, 2013), the specific politics behind morality policy-making 
(Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Mooney & Lee, 1995b; Tatalovich, Smith, & Bobic, 1994) or the expla-
nation of cross-national policy variance (Blofield, 2006; Engeli, 2009; Knill, Preidel, & Nebel, 2014; 
Minkenberg, 2002), only the latter is relevant for this study. Abortion and same-sex marriage are two of 
the quintessential morality policies but others such as euthanasia regulations, gun control, prostitution, 
pornography and drug regulation can and have been studied as morality policies (Knill, Hurka, & Adam, 
2016). With a wealth of analyses looking specifically at abortion and/or same-sex partnership regulation, 
LGR is thus far a relatively understudied phenomenon (but see Taylor & Haider-Markel, 2015). Within 
the framework of morality policy research, the various policies are treated as members of a specific class 
of policies that function according to a common logic that differs from other types such as redistributive 
policy. Accordingly, most explanatory factors for policy output hold relevance not just for one specific 
policy, but for morality policy as a group and thus can be applied to LGR as well. 
In the second half of the 20th century, we see an emerging trend towards regulatory permissiveness in 
many Western countries. Because of the association of permissiveness, Westernness and modernity, most 
comparative studies in the field limit their case selection to Western-Europe and the US (e.g. Brooks, 
1992; Knill et al., 2014, 2014; Kollman, 2007; Kreitzer, 2015; Levels et al., 2014, 2014; Medoff, 2002; 
Medoff & Dennis, 2011; Minkenberg, 2002; Outshoorn, 1996; Schmitt, Euchner, & Preidel, 2013; Stud-
lar et al., 2013; Studlar & Burns, 2015; Wetstein & Albritton, 1995; Yishai, 1993 etc.). 
Interestingly, countries such as South Africa and Argentina have largely gone unnoticed, having funda-
mentally reformed some of their legal provisions regarding moral issues. This is a striking omission be-
cause, as we will see in this chapter, their sexual rights policy output is not only intriguing in itself, but a 
study of these two cases can also contribute to refining theories on religious influence on policy. 
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2.1 Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage and LGR Policy in South Africa and Argentina 
Abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR are issues related to sex and gender, as well as the social norms 
and roles attached to the binary concepts of women/men and of female/male. Moreover, these issues 
touch upon fundamental societal values around themes of sexuality, reproduction, gender relations and 
family. Hence, the regulation of these issues by the state has provoked profound moral conflicts and heated 
political debates in many countries across the globe. 
Abortion policy regulates whether a woman can legally end an unwanted pregnancy, and if so, under 
which conditions. Owing to women’s reproductive potential, abortion policy is targeted at women only. 
LGR refers to the legally established procedures and hurdles that trans individuals must comply with in 
order to invoke a change of name and legal gender on official documents, such as birth certificates and 
passports. Same-sex marriage refers to opening up the legal institution of marriage, with all its rights and 
duties afforded to same-sex couples. 
Until 1975, abortion was illegal in South Africa, except when the life of the mother was endangered. The 
Abortion and Sterilisation Act of 1975 (Act No. 2 of 1975), as amended in 1982, permitted abortions on 
further grounds, notably in cases of a threat to the woman’s life or physical and/or mental health, physical 
or mental defects of the foetus and in the case of the pregnancy having resulted from unlawful behaviour 
such as rape, incest or intercourse with an “idiot or imbelice”. 
After democratisation in 1994, the South African parliament passed a new abortion law. The Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act was enacted in 1996 and, as the name suggests, legalised a choice-based 
model or abortion on demand (Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (No 2 of 1996), 1996). More 
specifically, under this act an abortion can be obtained upon request during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy. Thereafter, from the thirteenth up until the twentieth week of pregnancy, an abortion is legal 
if a medical practitioner deems the pregnancy a risk to the woman’s physical or mental health, the foetus 
to be at risk of physical or mental abnormality, the pregnancy to have resulted from rape or incest or if 
the continuation of pregnancy would impact significantly upon the economic or social circumstances of 
the woman. From the twentieth week of pregnancy up until birth, an abortion can be performed if two 
medical professionals agree that a continuation of pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, or that it would 
pose a risk of injury or malformation in the foetus. 
Another noteworthy aspect regarding additional procedural requirements in South Africa’s current abor-
tion regulations is that women who seek an abortion must be informed of their rights when requesting the 
procedure. Counselling is not mandatory and there is no requirement of spousal or parental consent, even 
in the case of a minor. Accordingly, the country’s abortion regulations are not only exceptional on the 
African continent but South Africa affords women more legal options to obtain an abortion than most 
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countries in the world. This is especially the case regarding the legality of abortion up until the twentieth 
pregnancy week on socio-economic grounds (see e.g. Budde, Knill et al., 2017 for an overview of abortion 
regulatory approaches in OECD and BRICS states). 
Another case of an exceptional regulation can be found in South Africa’s same-sex marriage policy. In 
2006, South Africa became the first and only country in Africa to extend marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. The Civil Union Act (No 17 of 2006) provides for the solemnisation of civil unions by way of 
civil partnership or marriage. Previously, marriage in South Africa was regulated by the Marriage Act of 
1961 (Act 25 of 1961) which was based on the common law definition of marriage, precluding same-sex 
couples (Vos, 2008). In section 1 of the Act of 2006, a civil union is defined as “the voluntary union of 
two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, which is solemnized and registered by way of marriage 
or a civil partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to the exclusion, while it 
lasts, of all others.” Section 13 determines that both heterosexual and homosexual couples entering into a 
Civil Union marriage have the same rights, duties and privileges as those entering a marriage under the 
Marriage Act. As a result, the Civil Union Act amended all existing South African legislation referencing 
marriage so that they apply equally to same-sex couples (Vos, 2008, p. 169). 
It is important to note that marriages in South Africa can currently be solemnised under the Marriage Act 
of 1961 (heterosexual couples) and under the Civil Union Act of 2006 (heterosexual and homosexual 
couples). Furthermore, couples can also form a civil partnership under the Civil Union Act (heterosexual 
and homosexual couples). Both the Civil Union marriage as well as marriage in terms of the Marriage Act 
can be officiated by public servants and religious officials (ibid., p. 171). 
What is interesting about South Africa’s marriage legislation is that the Civil Union Act of 2006 was not 
preceded by the creation of a partnership regime, as was the case in most European countries that legalised 
gay marriage, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and France. Rather, South Africa went directly from no 
legal recognition of same-sex partnerships (even having criminalised homosexuality under apartheid up 
until ten years before) to wholly legalising gay marriage and also creating a partnership regime at the same time. 
Same-sex marriage is not the only set of LGBT rights enshrined in South Africa’s legal system. In 2003, 
the country passed the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act (Act 49 of 2003, commencement 
date: March 15th 2004). Subsection 2.1 of this Act allows for a change in gender in legal documents for 
“[a]ny person whose sexual characteristics have been altered by surgical or medical treatment or by evolve-
ment through natural development resulting in gender reassignment, or any person who is intersexed” 
(Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 2003, 2003). Individuals can apply for the alteration of 
the sex description on their birth register to the Director-General of the National Department of Home 
Affairs. With the application they must submit a report by a medical practitioner stating nature and results 
 - 11 - 
of performed medical treatments, and another report by a second medical practitioner who has medically 
examined the applicant regarding their new sexual characteristics (subsec. 2.2a and 2.2b). Once the ap-
plication is granted, the person concerned is deemed for all purposes to be a person of the new sex as from 
the date of legal gender change (subsec. 3.2). 
Turning our attention to Argentina, it became the tenth country in the world when it legalised gay mar-
riage in July 2010 (Law 26.618 on Civil Marriage). This was achieved by passing a law that alters the 
provisions of the civil code pertaining to marriage, so that reference to heterosexuality or opposite sex 
partners was changed into a gender neutral form (Congreso de la Nación Argentina, 2010). In art. 42 of 
the law it states: “No judicial norm in Argentina shall be interpreted or applied in a sense that limits, 
restricts, excludes or suppresses the enjoyment of the same rights and duties pertaining to marriage con-
stituted of persons of the same sex or formed by persons of distinct sex.” Under this law, not only marriage 
but also adoption by gay couples was legalised. Just as in South Africa, Argentina opened up marriage to 
same-sex couples without introducing a partnership regime with fewer rights than marriage beforehand. 
While the introduction of gay marriage in Argentina came as a surprise to many international observers, 
the most astonishing development in Argentine LGBT legislation was yet to come. 
In 2012, Argentina reformed its LGR regulations. Law 26.743 on Gender Identity “establishes the right 
to gender identity of persons” (Ley de Identidad de Genero, 2012). According to art. 3 of the law, anybody 
can request an official rectification of sex and change of name if these do not coincide with the self-per-
ceived gender identity. Article 4 contains ground-breaking provisions as it explicitly states that “[i]n no 
case will it be required to have undergone surgical intervention for total or partial genital reassignment; 
neither will it be required to have undergone hormone therapy or other psychological or medical treat-
ment.” The gender and name change is a mere administrative act without cost to the individual concerned 
or involvement of courts or lawyers. As a result it is easier to change one’s legal gender in Argentina than 
in any other country in the world, and the passage of the bill was celebrated by human rights activists 
internationally (OutRight Action International, 2012). 
In contrast to Argentina’s far developed LGBT rights legislations stands its regulation of abortion. Argen-
tine Criminal Law art. 86 prohibits abortion except in cases of rape3 or threat to the woman’s life (Artículo 
86, 1922). The law dates back to 1922 and regulations have not been modified substantially since. The 
                                                     
3 The exact choice of words in Argentina’s abortion regulation of 1922 that is still law today is not clear as to whether abortion 
is permitted in the case of rape generally or only in the case of rape of a mentally handicapped woman. Interpretations of this 
passage have varied historically in Argentina and only in 2012 a high court decision clarified that any victim of sexual violence 
has the right to abortion (Diario Judicial, 2012). 
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fact that Argentina has advanced LGBT rights legislation while abortion is still criminalised in many cir-
cumstances is a peculiar situation. In Europe, the progression of gender and sexuality rights has followed 
a common pattern that included an early reform of regulations of reproductive rights, followed by LGBT 
rights legislation in later decades (Belgrano Rawson, 2012, p. 173). Argentina’s non-legalisation of abor-
tion on demand not only differs from this common pattern of rights succession (from reproductive rights 
in the 1970s to LGBT rights emerging in the 1990s) as observed in Europe, but also stands in contrast to 
other sexual rights policies in Argentina.  
 
2.2 Permissive versus Restrictive Regulatory Patterns 
To systematically compare morality policy output, scholars often classify countries’ policies on a restric-
tiveness/permissiveness axis, the former conforming to traditionally conservative political views and the 
latter to more liberal ones (Budde, Knill et al., 2017; Knill et al., 2016; Mooney, 1999; Studlar et al., 
2013). In the context of this study, restrictiveness and permissiveness can be understood in terms of how 
fully a policy grants or restricts the individual’s legal ability to autonomously decide regarding their bodies 
and livelihood in the scope of abortion, marriage and LGR (see e.g. Budde, 2015; Budde & Heichel, 2016; 
Heichel, Knill, & Schmitt, 2013). Permissive policies grant individuals the right to choose to end a preg-
nancy, marry a partner of the same sex or legally live in a different gender to the one assigned at birth. On 
the other hand, restrictive policies limit individual choice by precluding certain options for individuals on 
the basis of their sex or gender identity. The prohibition of abortion limits a woman’s right to choose over 
her own body. A ban on gay marriage precludes the option to marry a partner of the same sex, such that 
some cannot marry because they are legally classified as either male or female and their partners are clas-
sified as the same. Restrictive LGR policy forces trans individuals to legally live in the gender that matches 
the assigned birth sex, rather than according to their gender identity. 
Countries all over the globe, but also in direct geographical proximity, vary greatly in the permissiveness of 
their morality policies (see e.g. Knill et al., 2016). In the case of abortion, countries’ regulations can straddle 
anything from total prohibition of abortion under all circumstances, as was the case in Chile4 until 2017, to 
leaving the decision entirely to the woman concerned up until a certain week during pregnancy, as we observe 
in South Africa. In terms of permissiveness, remaining in between the choice model and total prohibition the 
so-called indication model, under which certain indications have to be fulfilled in order for an abortion to be 
                                                     
4 Since 1980, Chile`s Constitution establishes a right to life that guarantees the protection of unborn life (1980). While Article 
119 of the Sanitary Code [Codigo Sanitario] of 1967 still permitted abortion on strictly medical grounds, one of the last acts of 
the Pinochet dictatorship was to change the Sanitary Code in 1989, ensuring that this option no longer existed (Dudley 1998, 
p. 49; see also law 18.826 substituting article 119 (Art. 119, 1989)). 
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legally obtainable. These include the pregnancy posing a threat to the mother’s health or being the result 
of rape or incest. Despite unsuccessful attempts to completely outlaw abortion in 2016, Poland’s current 
legislation5 is an example of such an indication model, as is Argentina’s regulation and Chile’s6 newly 
passed abortion law introduced in 2017. 
Regarding to gay marriage, the most permissive type of regulation is to include same-sex couples in the 
definition of marriage. South Africa and Argentina are among those countries that redefined the existing 
institution of marriage to include homosexual couples. Other countries, such as Chile7, chose to create a 
separate partnership system instead of redefining marriage. These usually entail fewer rights than marriage, 
especially when it comes to the adoption of children by same-sex couples. Most restrictive, however, are 
those countries that do not have any legal recognition of same-sex couples, as is the case in Poland. 
When it comes to LGR, some countries do not have any regulation in place, meaning the handling of requests by 
trans individuals to change their legal gender is up to the discretion of judges (e.g. Chile8, Poland9), resulting in 
arduous legal battles without certainty of an outcome for those concerned. The countries most supportive of 
individual choice are those in which the legal gender change is mostly an administrative process without invasive 
requirements, as in both South Africa and Argentina. In the middle of the spectrum in terms of permissiveness lie 
certain countries that have specific regulations in place to deal with requests of gender changes but impose the 
requirement of invasive and often lengthy procedures such as years of psychotherapy, forced sterilisation and di-
vorce or sex reassignment surgery to be met in order to change one’s legal gender. For instance, Germany’s law 
on transsexuals of 1980 requires sterilisation and divorce but these provisions were struck down by the constitu-
tional court10. Table 1 sums up the possible regulatory approaches in all three policy areas categorised according 
to their permissiveness, or how fully they grant or restrict individual choice in the matter under regulation. 
                                                     
5 Law of 7 January 1993 on family planning, protection of human foetuses and the conditions under which pregnancy termina-
tion is permissible (Zgromadzenie Narodowe [Parliament of Poland] (1993)). 
6 Law 41.866 of 2017 regulating the depenalisation of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy under three indications (Law 
41.866 of 2017 regulating the depenalisation of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy under three indications, 2017). 
7 Law 20.830 of 2015 Law of civil unions (Crea el Acuerdo de Unión Civil, 2015). 
8 On the 23rd of January 2018, a bill on gender identity was passed in the Chilean House of Representatives. At the time of 
writing the bill awaits further discussion in the senate. Should the senate approve, it is likely that the bill will have to pass 
through the constitutional court as well. However, the Chilean LGBT movement’s efforts may be thwarted as the newly elected 
conservative president Piñera will take office in April 2018. If the bill is not passed by then, chances for successful passage are 
slim (El Mostrador, 2018). 
9 In 2015 both chambers in Poland passed the Gender Accordance Act, which would have regulated LGR. However, a presi-
dential veto stopped the passage. In such cases, the vote of at least 50% of parliament can override a presidential veto. However, 
such a vote did not even take place as the relevant parliamentary committee failed to prepare a necessary report in time. As a 
result, Poland still remains without a codification of LGR procedures until today (ILGA, 2015). 
10 Germany passed transgender legislation in 1980 with very restrictive provisions. The German Constitutional Court struck 
down most of these provisions one by one, including mandatory divorce and sterilisation, a minimum age of 25 and compulsory 
surgery. While no new law has been passed by parliament, the constitutional court decisions shaped the provision so that 
currently ‘only’ two psychological or psychiatric evaluations certifying the person’s gender identity are needed to apply for a 
gender change (Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen 
Fällen, 1980).  
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Table 1. Classification Scheme of Regulatory Approaches in Sexual Rights Policy 
Policy Restrictive Medium Permissive 
Abortion Total Prohibition Indication Models Choice Models 
SSM No Recognition Partnership Regimes Marriage open to Same-Sex 
Couples 
LGR No Regulation Invasive Requirements Non-invasive Requirements 
Note: Invasive requirements for legal gender recognition include the following: sex reassignment surgery, sterili-
sation and divorce in case of the individual being married. Non-invasive requirements include medical diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria and the like, proof of medical treatment such as hormone therapy (but no surgery) and proof of 
psychotherapy. 
 
This classification scheme is applied to the three policies in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile in 
Table 2. In the table we see that Argentina and South Africa have an overall permissive pattern of regula-
tion, while Chile and Poland regulate more restrictively in almost all policy areas and thus relatively ho-
mogenous regulatory patterns across policy issues within countries. This supports the idea underlying 
morality policy scholarship that such policies form a class of policies with common explanatory factors. 
 
Table 2. Sexual Rights Regulation in Argentina, Chile, Poland and South Africa 
Country Policy Permissiveness in the area of:  
 Abortion Same-sex mar-
riage 
LGR Overall  
Pattern 
Argentina  M (1922) X (2010) X (2012) X 
Chile M (2017) M (2015) 0 0 
Poland M (1993) 0 0 0 
South Africa X (1996) X (2006) X (2004) X 
Note: X: Permissive Regulation; M: Medium Regulation; 0: Restrictive Regulation, year in parenthesis. 
Source: own classification 
 
However, more puzzlingly from the perspective of morality policy scholarship, Argentina and South Africa regu-
late permissively. As we shall see, most of the prominent theories in the field would lead us to expect South Africa 
and Argentina to regulate at least as restrictively as Poland and Chile, rather than more permissively. 
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2.3 Existing Explanations for Sexual Rights Policy Output 
In recent decades, scholars have stressed various types of factors accounting for the permissiveness or 
restrictiveness of sexual rights policy output. Structural explanations focusing on culture and values of 
countries co-exist with approaches concentrating on the influence exerted by political parties and party 
systems, and with institutional explanations in studies investigating the impact of formal and informal 
state/church relationships on policy output. 
Explanations of the structural kind are prominent in morality policy research, because such policies regu-
late value conflicts and are therefore likely to be influenced by the values held by the electorate and poli-
ticians. These values are either measured directly, as is the case in accounts of public opinion, or approx-
imated through levels of socio-economic modernisation and religious adherence. 
Political parties play an important role in democratic decision making processes. Partisan theory, as one 
of the classic theories in comparative public policy scholarship, has also left its mark on analyses of morality 
policy (e.g. Brooks, 1992; Gindulis 2003; Levels et al. 2014; Budde et al. 2017). Furthermore, with the 
two-worlds theory by Engeli et al. (2012), an explanatory approach developed specifically for the context 
of morality policy argues that the presence or absence of a religious party cleavage is decisive for the 
politicisation of moral issues. 
Two related but fundamentally differing theoretical arguments exist about the impact of the relationship 
between state and church. Accounts stressing the importance of the formal state/church relationship look 
at the legal ties between those two institutions, i.e. whether a state has an official state-church, both are 
completely separated or something in between (e.g. Minkenberg, 2003). In contrast, scholars stressing 
the role of the informal state/church relationship assess historically formed cultures of conflict or coop-
eration between these institutions that can provide opportunities for church influence, independently from 
formal ties (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; Knill & Preidel, 2014). 
When testing the explanatory potential of these theories for South African and Argentinian sexual rights 
regulations, the puzzling nature of their policy output becomes apparent. As we shall see, both countries 
deviate on almost all accounts from what we would expect according to theories, except in terms of their 
informal state/church relationship structures.  
 
Structural explanations: culture and values 
Structural explanations for policy output seek to account for cross-national variance in policies through 
the social and economic structure of polities. In morality policy research, theories that stress the role of 
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the levels of socio-economic modernisation and inequality of a country, of the denominational composi-
tion, religiosity of the population and of public opinion can be classified as structural explanations. For 
clarity, we will review each of these. 
Modernisation and inequality. As one of the most influential paradigms in social science re-
search (Stockemer & Sundström, 2016, p. 696), modernisation theory has also left its mark on compara-
tive morality policy scholarship. Perhaps this is the case because the notion of modernity is inextricably 
linked to progressive values. For instance, Borrillo (2009) observes that same-sex marriage policy has 
developed into a “thermometer of modernity”. 
Modernisation theory in comparative policy analysis posits that as a country’s level of socio-economic 
development rises, the state must to respond to an increasingly differentiated and individualistic society. 
Modernisation theory contains a functionalistic logic in which policy change is a state’s response to new 
demands emerging from a modernising society (Obinger, 1998, 2015). This is especially the case for the 
processes accompanying the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society, such as rising education 
levels and living standards, urbanisation, technological advancements, demographic change, declining fer-
tility rates and women entering the labour force (Bell, 1974; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 
2004). Moreover, modernisation theory propounds that these processes trigger value shifts in the popu-
lation from material security towards self-expression and individualism, creating a demand for policies 
that reflect such post(modern) values. Studies that focus on or control for the role of socio-economic 
modernisation in morality policy research therefore predict high levels of modernisation in a country to 
be commensurate with permissive morality policy output (Asal, Brown, & Figueroa, 2008; Gindulis, 
2003; Mooney & Lee, 1995a, p. 622). 
A sub-variant of modernisation theoretical studies of particular importance for an investigation of non-
Western contexts stresses the importance of structural measures of inequality. Simon Kuznet (1955) fa-
mously argued that inequality relates to economic modernisation in an inverted U-shaped manner (Kuz-
net’s curve), rising in the early stages of economic development and falling again as modernisation ad-
vances. Viewed in that light, both Argentina and South Africa fall in the stage of economic development 
that is characterised by heightened inequality. 
In one of the few studies that explains morality policy output not in exclusively Western contexts, Blofield 
(2006) makes a structural argument about the relationship between socio-economic inequality and the 
divorce and abortion policies of Spain, Chile and Argentina. Blofield contends that moral reforms were 
successful in Spain because of its comparatively low inequality, whereas the conditions of high economic 
inequality in Chile and Argentina make it difficult for interest groups to accomplish their policy goals. 
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Accordingly, the causal chain of this argument is that high levels of inequality produce particularly influ-
ential political elites, many of whom do not have an interest in morality policy reform. Blofield argues 
that moral conflict regarding a policy issue can divert attention away from inequality. A religious moral 
conflict in a country can thus provide legitimacy to a discourse that focuses on a lack of morality as being 
the root cause for social problems instead of economic inequality. According to Blofield, this lack of sup-
port from the disproportionately influential elites make morality policy change in conditions of high ine-
quality less likely. 
To specifically account for abortion policy, various other studies test for the influence of structural 
measures of gender inequality (Asal et al., 2008; Budde & Heichel, 2016; Gindulis, 2003). The causal 
logic behind these studies is that decreasing gender inequality in societies not only influences female pref-
erences to embrace more pro-abortion stances, but also gives them the political clout to claim reproduc-
tive rights. 
The empirical expectations that can be derived from modernisation theory generally, as well as specific 
accounts on inequality, are that high levels of socio-economic modernisation go hand in hand with per-
missive policy output while high levels of inequality are equally congruent with restrictive regulations. 
Table 3 contrasts various measures of socio-economic development and inequality with the overall pattern 
of permissiveness of moral regulation in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile. In addition to GDP per 
capita, a classic measurement for economic development, Table 3 includes the Human Development Index11 
(HDI) to better capture the social aspects of socio-economic modernisation. Regarding inequality, Table 3 
also includes the Gini Coefficient, a standard measurement of income inequality, and the Gender Inequality 
Index12 (GII), a composite measure which captures gender inequality in three dimensions – reproductive 
health, empowerment and economic status. While the Gini Coefficient ranges between 0 (full income equal-
ity) and 1 (maximal income inequality), the GII assigns a country’s ranking according to their relative position 
in terms of gender equality with other countries. Rank position 1 is assigned to the most equal country, while 
151 equates to the comparatively most unequal position available. 
  
                                                     
11 Apart from income per capita, the HDI also includes measures of education and life expectancy in order to comprehensively 
capture a country’s level of development. 
12 The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is the latest measure of Gender Inequality used by the UNDP. It was introduced to remedy 
the shortcomings of previously used measures, such as the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM). The GII measures gender inequality on three dimensions. The first, reproductive health, is measured by 
maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates. The second dimension, empowerment, is measured by the share of women 
in parliament and with secondary education levels. The third is economic status, which is measured by labour force participa-
tion. 
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Country GDP HDI Ranks  Gini Coefficient 
 
Gender Inequal-
ity Index Rank 
Permissive Argentina 12337.59 
(Up. Mid. Inc.) 




(Up. Mid. Inc.) 
118  63.1 94 
Restrictive Chile 12526.56 
(High Income) 
41 52.1 68 
Poland 16700.9 
(High Income) 
35 32.7 26 
Note: Up. Mid Inc. short for Upper Middle Income; GDP values 2010 from source: Penn World Table (Feenstra, 
Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013); HDI Ranks 2012; Gini Coefficient 2003-2012; Gender equality Index 2013 (ranked 1 
to 151), Source of all: (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015) UNDP 
 
Interestingly, with its permissive regulations, South Africa is the least modernised country in all measures 
listed compared with the others featured in the table. Furthermore, with a GDP of roughly $7 500 per 
capita in South Africa and $12 300 in Argentina respectively, both are classified as “Upper Middle Income” 
countries by the World Bank, while Chile and Poland are “High Income” countries. Despite that catego-
risation, Chile and Argentina actually display a very similar level of economic modernisation in terms of 
GDP, which would lead us to expect similar types of moral regulations. Even more surprising, with 
around $16 700, Poland’s GDP is more than double the size of South Africa’s. Thus, we would expect 
more restrictive regulations in South Africa. Yet, the opposite is true. 
Regarding the other measures, the situation is equally puzzling. Contrary to what we would expect and 
despite its restrictive sexual rights regulation, Poland takes the lead in terms of HDI ranking, followed by 
Chile. Argentina and South Africa occupy higher HDI ranks, indicating lower development, than the other 
two. Income inequality alone cannot explain why South Africa and Argentina regulate more permissively 
than the other two countries either, as both countries have substantively higher levels of inequality than 
Poland and Chile and we see a similar picture for the gender inequality index that ranks Poland and Chile 
as more equal than South Africa and Argentina.  
In summary, we find that the levels of development and inequality in South Africa and Argentina compared 
with Poland and Chile would lead us to expect sexual rights regulations in the former two to be at least as 
restrictive as in the latter two. 
Denominational composition and religiosity. The most important influence factor in the liter-
ature on morality policies is religion. The regulation of life and death, sexuality and reproduction touch 
upon many aspects of religious core doctrine (Heichel et al., 2013). This intimate connection between 
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morality and religion (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, & Thorup Larsen, 2012), and the fact that religious insti-
tutions are among the most outspoken opponents against morality policy change towards permissiveness, 
has provoked great interest in religion by scholars seeking to account for cross-national differences in 
moral regulations. 
Structural explanations of religious influence argue that the denominational composition of societies and 
levels of religiosity within the population shape policy output. Despite variations in operationalisation, the 
common expectation behind studies in this area is that countries with a high share of adherents to denom-
inations with conservative moral stances and/or religious devout populations regulate more restrictively 
than countries whose main denominations have more permissive moral standpoints, or possess a less reli-
giously devout population. 
Ever since Minkenberg (2002) used church attendance rates in his pioneering study to measure the reli-
gious devoutness of populations, this figure has been included in most studies on religious influence on 
morality policy. However, the picture is less clear cut when it comes to the denominational factor, as it is 
operationalised differently according to the cultural context under investigation. Possibly inspired by what 
Paternotte (2015, p. 660) calls the Scandinavian experience, i.e. same-sex partnership policy originating in 
the Protestant Scandinavian countries, studies set in a European context mostly use the strength of Catholi-
cism to operationalise denominational composition (Castles, 1994; Castles, 1998; Minkenberg, 2002). Con-
versely, in the context of the United States, scholars have focused on the role of evangelical Protestantism 
and the effect of its strongly opposed stance on permissive moral regulations (e.g. Scheitle & Hahn, 2011).  
This presents a complication in the application of arguments regarding the denominational composition in 
the context of the present study. Argentina, Poland and Chile, with their Catholic cultural heritage, would 
lend themselves to the European approach, while the structure of South Africa’s religious landscape is 
more akin to the US- American context, in that it has a great factionalism within Christianity that includes 
various, mostly Protestant churches with often conservative but diverging moral standpoints. 
In other words, while the share of the Catholic population represents a reasonable approximation of the 
prevalence of religious conservativism in the three Catholic societies, this is not the case in South Africa. 
Therefore, an investigation into the religious stratification of South African society must be a two-step 
process, comprising of a detailed measure of the various denominations present followed by an assessment 
of their moral standpoints. 
I tackled this challenge by first consulting the most recent South African national consensus on religious 
affiliation (the 2001 Census) to learn about the numerical representation of the various denominations. 
Afterward, I proceeded to code the degree of moral conservativism of the various Christian denominations 
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present from information on their individual websites, church publications and indirectly via their mem-
bership in international church associations that differ in levels of conservativism. This approach is similar 
to the one employed by Budde, Knill et al. (2017), with the difference that the latter article did so only 
for the one most prevalent denomination in every one of its sample countries, however this ventures into 
more detail by investigating the moral standpoints of any and every Christian denomination with more 
than 1 percent of the population adhering to it. 
Tables 4 and 5 contain data on the religious stratification of South African, Argentine, Polish and Chilean soci-
ety. South Africa’s more complex denominational structure is displayed separately from the others in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Structural Measures of Religion contrasted with Patterns of Sexual Rights Regulations 
Pattern of sexual 
rights regulation 
Country Protestant Catholic  Church Attend-
ance > once per 
month 
Permissive Argentina 0.1 0.75 35.9 
South Africa   69 
Restrictive Chile 0.11 0.76 36.6 
Poland 0.00 0.88 67.2 
Data Sources: Denomination Composition: World Religion Dataset- National Religion Dataset, Christian Adher-
ence in 2010; Church Attendance Rates: World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Argentina 2013, Chile 2011, 
Poland 2012, South-Africa 2013. 
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Table 5.Christian Denominations and their Moral Stances in South Africa 
Denomination 
Percentage of Total 
Population 
Moral Stance 
Dutch Reformed 6.71 conservative 
Zion Christian 11.09 conservative 
Roman Catholic 7.1 conservative 
Methodist 7.37 permissive 
Pentecostal/Charismatic 7.64 conservative 
Anglican 3.84 permissive 
Lutheran 2.52 permissive 
Presbyterian 1.86 conservative 
Baptist 1.54 conservative 
Congregational 1.14 conservative 
Apostolic churches, including Apostolic Faith Mission 13.06 conservative 
Other Zionist churches 4.21 conservative 
Other African independent churches, including Ethiopian type 
churches 3.43 
conservative 
Other Christian churches 9.99 n.a. 
Source for Denominational Composition: Statistics South Africa, 2001 (Census 2001), Source for moral conserva-
tivism: own investigations 
 
Table 4 shows that the majority of the population in Argentina, Poland and Chile is Catholic. Due to their 
shared Catholic heritage, we would expect all of them to regulate restrictively13. While Poland has the highest 
percentage of Catholics in its population, Argentina and Chile have almost exactly the same share of Catholics, 
leaving us wondering why religion seems to have impacted upon Chile’s legislations, but not on Argentina’s. 
According to the last South African census that asked about denominational affiliation, over 80 percent of the 
population adheres to Christianity (Statistics South Africa, 2001, Census 2001). As displayed in Table 5, most 
of the Christian churches in South Africa have conservative stances on moral issues. Exception to this come in 
the form of the Methodist, Anglican and Lutheran churches. While the different data sources and approaches for 
South Africa vis-á-vis the other countries limit comparability between them, Table 5 shows that there is no wide-
spread moral permissiveness of churches that could explain permissive sexual rights policy output in South Africa. 
                                                     
13 The growing strength of conservative Evangelicalism in Latin America probably underestimates religious conservativism in 
Argentina and Chile, which would make them even more similar to Poland. 
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Table 4 also contains data on the religious devoutness within the four countries’ populations. South Africa 
and Poland have comparatively highly religious populations with almost 70 percent attending church at 
least once per month. Chile and Argentina have almost identical high church attendance rates to each 
other, around 35 percent. Thus, it is not the religious devoutness that explains the differences in regulatory 
permissiveness for those cases. 
Values in the Population. Public opinion holds an obvious importance for public policy in rep-
resentative democracies in general. Since morality policies are salient issues characterised by a high public 
involvement due to their technical simplicity, the stance of the population on moral issues should be very 
visible to politicians and the link between public opinion and policy output should be even more pro-
nounced than for other policies (Camobreco & Barnello, 2008; Mooney, 1999, p. 676). 
Modernisation theory and arguments about the influence of religion on morality policy and other cultural 
explanations all implicitly include the values of the population in their causal logic. These theories empha-
sise different factors and associated processes that shape the preferences of the electorate, which are then 
assumed to be translated into policy via the electoral democratic system. Morality policy research that 
includes public opinion as an explanatory variable (e.g. Badget 2009; Wetstein & Albritton 1995; Kreitzer 
2015) examines a shorter, more direct causal chain by refraining from testing those factors that influence 
values in order to directly assess whether the public’s stance on certain issues translates into policy. 
The empirical expectations that can be derived from public opinion as an explanatory factor for mo-
rality policy output is that high levels of public support for a certain issue should go hand in hand with 
a permissive regulatory pattern, and low levels of public support in countries should translate into 
more restrictive regulations. The direction of influence, however, is not as straightforward. It could 
also be the case that once a policy is adopted public opinion gradually changes. For example, opening 
up marriage to same-sex couples could normalise homosexual relations in the eyes of the public and 
decrease public aversion against homosexuality.  
The World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS) are the largest surveys of their kind on 
the value sets held by populations. Both include questions on stances on abortion and homosexuality but no 
specific question on gender change or gender identity. For a first non-policy specific test of the nexus between 
postmodern values prevalent in the population and sexual rights policy output, the twelve-item based Post-
materialism Index included in the survey datasets can be used. Table 6 lists results of the latest World Value 
Survey Wave (2010-2014).  
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Table 6. Post-Materialist Values in the Population contrasted with Pattern of Moral Regulations 
Pattern of moral regulation Country Mostly Post-Materialist Values, 





South Africa 36 
Restrictive Chile 49 
Poland 36 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 (variable y002). 
Note: The Likert-Scale responses have been condensed by adding up all response categories that lay closer to the 
Postmaterialism end of the scale than to the Materialist end (i.e., the variable includes 6 response categories – 
Materialist, 1,2,3,4, Post-materialist). Included in the table as “Mostly Post-Materialist” are the accumulated re-
sponses of Post-materialist and categories 3 and 4. 
 
Contrary to what theory would lead us to expect, with 49 percent of the population, Chile has the highest 
prevalence of post-materialist values and Argentina has the lowest percentage (32 percent). Divergently 
regulating South Africa and Poland display the same relatively low spread of post-materialism (36 percent 
each). It can be seen that none of these four countries have a majority of the population who hold post-
materialistic values, which underlines the curiosity of South Africa and Argentina regulating  sexual rights 
issues permissively. 
Table 7 lists results from the WVS questions that ask respondents whether they agree that homosexuality 
and abortion are ever justified. These are contrasted with the disaggregated policy output for these issue 
areas. In order to rule out the potentially confounding effect of policy change on public opinion, the table 
lists the survey wave that precedes the first introduction of a permissive policy in the respective issue area 
(that is the 1989-1993 wave for data on abortion and the 1999-2004 wave for data on homosexuality). 
 
Table 7. Public Opinion contrasted with Sexual Rights Policy Output 
Country SSM Policy Homosexuality 
never justified 
Abortion Policy Abortion never 
justifiable 
Argentina X (2010) 36 M (1922) 45 
South Africa X (2006) 46 X (1996) 59 
Chile M (2015) 35 M (2017) 75 
Poland 0 56 M (1993) 43 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 1999-2004 (Question: Is Homosexuality justifiable?), World Value Survey 
Wave 1989-1993 (Is abortion justifiable?). 
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When it comes to homosexuality, the percentage of the population that found homosexuality unjustified under any 
circumstance was highest in Poland (56 percent) and South Africa (46 percent), with Argentina and Chile being 
roughly equal (36 and 35 percent, respectively). In Poland the high percentage of rejection of homosexuality corre-
sponds to the lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships. In contrast, in South Africa a relatively high percent-
age of the population opposing homosexuality stands at odds with the country having legalised gay marriage. In Chile 
and Argentina, still more than one third of respondents found homosexuality to be unjustified, and that just refers to 
homosexuality in general and not to the more far-reaching state recognition of homosexual relationships through 
legalising same-sex marriage. 
When looking at abortion policy and public opinion, Table 7 shows that very high levels of anti-abortion stances in 
the population of Chile (75 percent) go hand in hand with limited abortion rights in the country. A still considerable 
but lower 43 percent of Polish respondents found no circumstance to justify abortion. Notably, levels of strict anti-
abortion stances in South Africa and Argentina are even higher than in Poland (45 and 59 percent). Here especially, 
the opposing stance of a clear majority of the South African population forms a puzzling contrast to the country’s 
very permissive regulation of abortion. 
All in all, the values of the population as measured in public opinion data would lead us to expect South Africa and Argentina 
to regulate at least equally restrictively as Poland and Chile. More specifically, while the values of most indicators corre-
spond to policy output in the latter two, Argentina and South Africa clearly deviate from theoretical expectations. 
 
Political explanations: Political parties and party systems 
Partisan theory holds that the partisan composition of government influences policy output (Schmidt, 
1997). From this theoretical perspective, political parties are expected to systematically differ in the pol-
icies they pass. If parties are assumed to display policy-seeking behaviour, that is trying to pass policies 
that express their party’s ideological position (regardless of the popularity of that policy in the population), 
then an assessment of parties in power at the time of policy passage can provide insight into the causes of 
policy change or stagnation (Wenzelburger, 2015). 
While partisan theory is one of the classical approaches in comparative public policy research, an account 
specific to morality policy is the two words theory, by Engeli et al. (2012). Here the focus rests not on 
government participation by specific parties but historically formed religious party cleavages that shape 
party incentives to politicise moral issues in the first place. 
Partisan influence. Most comparative studies that use partisan theory to account for morality 
policy output use the strength of certain party families in government to test whether parties actually play 
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a role in morality policy creation. For the US context, studies have investigated the influence of Demo-
cratic control of government on policy output (e.g. Kreitzer, 2015, p. 46). Cross-national studies have 
mostly taken into account the role of leftist parties in government (Brooks, 1992, pp. 352–353; Budde, 
Heichel, Hurka, & Knill, 2017; Gindulis, 2003, pp. 62–64; Levels et al., 2014, p. 103). Since leftist 
parties tend to occupy more lenient positions on socio-cultural issues, the empirical expectation is gov-
ernment participation by leftist parties to lead to more permissive morality policies than under conserva-
tive governments. 
After studying government parties in South Africa, Chile, Poland and Argentina, we see that parties on 
the left held government responsibilities in all of them at some point since their respective democratisa-
tions. The exception to this is Argentina, which’s party system defies classification in traditional party 
families. In Chile, leftist parties formed part of governing coalitions multiple times since the end of the 
Pinochet regime. The Concertación por la Democracia, the centre-left party coalition that formed after the 
Pinochet regime has won several consecutive elections, dominating Chilean politics since the return to 
democracy. The coalition has since included the Socialist Party, the Radical Social Democratic Party, the 
Christian Democrats and the Party for Democracy (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007). Nevertheless, Chile’s gov-
ernments refrained from passing very permissive policies. Similarly, Poland has repeatedly been ruled by 
the Democratic Left Alliance (that formed as a centre-left electoral coalition in 1991 and later became a 
party in 1999) since democratisation without substantively reforming morality policies towards permis-
siveness (Szczerbiak, 2016). 
Since democratisation in 1994, South Africa has been governed nationally by the African National Con-
gress (ANC), Nelson Mandela’s liberalisation movement turned political party. The ANC was formed as 
an extra-parliamentary organisation in 1912 with the aim to represent the interests of the non-white (i.e. 
Black, Coloured, Indian) population that was excluded from participating in the electoral parliamentary 
system (Botha, 1996). During apartheid, race was the main political cleavage, rather than left and right. 
The phase that led up to democratisation restructured the main cleavage to be between a party’s “role in 
the apartheid system vis-a-vis their role in the liberation struggle” (ibid., p.  215f.). Despite this peculiarity 
of the South African party system, the ANC can still meaningfully be classified as a leftist party. Scholars 
describe the ANC as influenced by socialist principles (ibid: 221), as a mass-based party with increasing 
clientilistic and neopatrialistic tendencies (Lodge, 2014, p. 3), as a leftist mass-party (Heichel & Rinschein, 
2015) or as social democratic (Manifesto Project Dataset Version 2014b by Volkens et al., 2014). Due to 
the ANC’s uninterrupted rule since democratisation, all sexual rights policy reforms have been passed 
under the rule of a leftist party. 
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The picture is different in Argentina, where neither of the two dominant parties – the Peronist Party 
Partido Justicialista (PJ) and its main competitor the Radical Party Unión Civica Radical UCR) fit into the 
logic of cross-nationally comparable party families. The main political cleavage in Argentina is not between 
left and right, but rather between Peronism and Anti-Peronism (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 1). Both straddle the 
full spectrum of positions on the left and right and have historically crosscut the left-right axis. Since the rise 
of Peronism in the 1940s, a mass movement named after its founder and former Argentine president Juan 
Peron, scholars have struggled to categorise it (Kitschelt, 2010, p. 93; Lupu & Stokes, 2009, p. 58). Among 
others, the PJ has been labelled by experts as national-populist, social-Christian, neoliberalist and popular con-
servative (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 2). 
The passage of permissive sexual rights policies culminates during the second presidency of Cristina Fer-
nández de Kirchner (2011-2015). Kirchner’s second term in office represents the seventh presidential 
term led by the Peronist PJ since democratisation in 1984. Directly after the regime change, President 
Raul Alfonsín, member of the PJ’s main competitor UCR whose party unexpectedly won the first newly 
democratic elections, legalised (heterosexual) divorce. Only after years of stagnation in the legal moral 
landscape, the second presidency of Kirchner witnessed not only the legalisation of gay marriage in 2010 
but also the passage of the Gender Identity Law and also the Dignified Death Law on euthanasia regulations 
in 2012, as well as regulation on surrogacy motherhood in 2013. While that means that most sexual rights 
policy change towards permissiveness happened under PJ’s rule, the fact that all these changes happened 
during one PJ presidency only and that no change happened during the six PJ led governments before that 
suggests that PJ party ideology is not the main determining factor for policy change in Argentina. Further-
more, the defiance of the Argentine party system to conform to traditional party families underlines what 
other scholars have suggested before; a limited applicability of partisan theory for morality policy outside 
of the Western context, where it was developed (Blofield, 2006; Burns, 2005; see also Adam, Heichel, 
& Knill, 2015, p. 713). 
Still, more promising as an explanation of sexual rights policies in the cases under study might be not to 
focus on party ideology, but rather on the facilitating and restricting contextual factors in which parties 
operate. For instance, the institutional environment in which parties are embedded affects their room to 
manoeuvre in passing their preferred policies, and can even shape party preferences. As suggested by 
Engeli et al. (2012), the existence of a religious/secular cleavage in the party system can produce an in-
centive for parties to politicise morality issues. 
Two worlds theory. The two worlds theory by Engeli et al. (2012) posits that the configuration 
of a state’s party system produces distinct patterns in the politicisation of moral issues. Engeli et al. dis-
tinguish between what they call the religious and the secular worlds, with the presence or absence of a 
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historically formed religious party cleavage as the distinguishing factor between the two. If a religious 
cleavage is present in the party system, the country is classified as belonging to the religious world. Con-
versely, if there is no such cleavage, it belongs to the secular world (p. 2f.). The authors argue that polit-
icisation of moral issues is more widespread in the religious world. In the historical development of such 
party systems, a conflict between state and church has led to the formation of religious-based parties, 
typically in the form of a Christian democratic party (p. 15, 18). Morality issues play out unfavourably for 
these religiously influenced parties because nowadays these parties need to have a broader appeal to the 
public, not just devout Christians. However, when confronted with moral issues, these parties tend to 
position themselves according to traditional Christian values in order to stay true to their basic values. 
This reduces their appeal to the broader electorate, a conundrum secular parties exploit by intentionally 
politicising moral issues (p. 15-19). 
The central argument of Engeli et al. refers to the politicisation of moral issues rather than policy output. 
While politicisation can be seen as a necessary condition for policy output, it is not a sufficient one as it 
does not automatically translate into policy passage. When looking solely at policy output, this means that 
the co-occurrence of permissive morality policy output with a religious party cleavage would conform to 
the expectations of the two worlds theory. Permissive policy output, in the absence of a religious party 
cleavage, would oppose the two world theory. However, a case that displays both restrictive policies and 
a religious party cleavage would not say anything about the explanatory value of the theory, as it might be 
the case that politicisation is high but nevertheless no policy was passed. 
The first step in investigating whether there is a religious party cleavage in the party system is to identify 
whether there are any religious parties in a country at all. Secondly, it must be evaluated whether these 
parties have a significant proportion of votes in order to have sufficient seats in the legislature, and thus 
constitute a veritable cleavage in the party system. The example of Norway, which Engeli et al. study in 
their book, helps to guide an evaluation as to the threshold of what constitutes a religious cleavage. The 
Norwegian Christian Democratic party has traditionally gained around 5 to 14 percent of the votes. In the 
absence of a consistently stronger result, Engeli et al. (2012, p.188) argue the party was too weak to 
provoke a religious party cleavage, and so they that find the country to belong to the secular world. 
Historically, neither Argentina nor South Africa had a religious cleavage in their respective party systems. 
In the 19th century, where the foundation of many cleavages that still impact upon today’s party systems 
were laid, the societal cleavage between state and church in Argentina was rather mild and did not trigger 
the formation of religious parties (McGuire, 1995, p. 227). “[A]nticlericalism was weaker in late nine-
teenth-century Argentina than in Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, or Mexico.” (Ibid.) Even though a Christian 
Democratic party emerged in Argentina as early as 1954, it was never able to earn more than 5 percent 
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of the vote in legislative elections, and thus was not strong enough to create a religious cleavage in Argen-
tina’s party system. During the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), the ruling military junta endorsed 
a Catholic nationalistic agenda but since opposition was oppressed and the junta was not a party in a dem-
ocratic sense, we cannot speak of a religious party cleavage in Argentina during the dictatorship either. 
In South Africa, the picture is similar. During Apartheid (1948-1994) there was no religious party in the 
party system (Botha, 1996, p. 217). However, the Dutch Reformed Church was very closely linked to 
the National Party, the leading political force in the apartheid regime. Only after democratisation in 1994, 
religious parties emerged in the South African party system. The African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP) is based on Christian values, and so is the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP). But nei-
ther has ever achieved more than two percent of the vote in national elections (Heichel & Rinschein, 2015) 
and as a consequence, like Argentina, South Africa belongs to the secular world.  
In Chile, however, the presence of a strong Christian democratic party slants the country towards the 
religious world. It has a historical Catholic/secular cleavage in the party system that preceded the Pinochet 
military regime, and re-emerged after democratisation (Bornschier, 2009, p. 8). Poland also displays a 
strong religious cleavage in its party system (Bértoa, 2012), and therefore belongs to the religious world. 
Table 8 sums up the worlds inhabited by these countries under the two worlds theory, and contrasts it 
with patterns of sexual rights policy output. 
 
Table 8 Religious/Secular World Memb. contrasted with Patterns of Sexual Rights Policy Output 
Pattern of moral regulation Country Two worlds Classification 
Permissive Argentina Secular 
South Africa Secular 
Restrictive Chile Religious 
Poland Religious 
Note: Own classification based on the concept of Engeli et al. (2012) 
 
After studying the above, the empirical pattern is diametrically opposed to what we would expect to 
discover according to the two worlds theory. Theoretically, we would have expected the presence of a 
religious party cleavage in Chile and Poland to increase the chances for sexual rights policy change to-
wards permissiveness, as there is a large incentive for Christian Democratic parties’ opponents to po-
liticise such policies. However, since politicisation does not equate to policy change, these two cases, 
while not confirming to two worlds theory, do not contradict it either. In contrast, in Argentina and 
South Africa, we would have expected the lack of a historically formed religious party cleavage to result 
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in low chances of politicisation, and thus no policy change. Yet, as we have seen, this could not be 
further from the truth. 
 
Institutional explanations: Formal and informal state/church relationship 
The final important strand of explanations for morality policy output looks directly at religious institu-
tions. However, aside from the structural arguments explored above, institutional explanations examine 
certain characteristics of the relationship between state and church that shape how institutionalised religion 
can intervene in the policy process as an actor or interest group. 
Accounts on the formal ties between state and church claim the degree of legal separation between these two 
institutions, e.g. whether there is an established state-church that impacts on the effectiveness with which 
churches can influence policy. Theories that focus on the informal dimension of state/church relations stress 
the importance of historically grown cultures of conflict or cooperation between these two institutions, and 
the moral authority held by churches as a resource they can draw from to influence public policy. 
Formal state/church relationship. The rationale of the formal state/church relationship as ex-
planatory factor is based on scholarship on what is known as the economics of religion approach, which 
argues that a degree of separation between state and church leads to churches competing in a religious 
market and therefore become more appealing to the public because they work harder in light of the reli-
gious competition, i.e. other churches (Iannaccone, 1998). On the other hand, a church that is established 
as a state-church acts as a public institution and has little or direct real competition on certain pertinent 
issues in the public domain, resulting in a diminished effectiveness in attracting new adherents and keeping 
the old ones (ibid.). Relying on this reasoning, Minkenberg (2003) has employed the state/church rela-
tionship as an independent variable to explain political outcomes. Minkenberg takes church/state relations 
as the institutional setting that provides opportunity structures for religious interests to influence state 
policy (ibid., p. 196). He argues that a state/church relation “at the ‘separationist’ or ‘non-establishment’ 
end of the continuum provides a more favourable opportunity structure for the presence of religious in-
terests in the political process than does a privileged position of churches in countries with officially es-
tablished state-churches“ (p. 209). Regarding expectations for policy output, this means that higher de-
grees of separation should go hand in hand with more restrictive patterns of morality policy, since churches 
can be expected to become more impactful due to the favourable independence from the state. Con-
versely, a close state/church relationship should limit the effectiveness of churches and result in more 
permissive policies. 
In recent decades, scholars have considerably improved the classic trichotomy of state/church separation, 
cooperation and state-religion. For instance, Chavez and Cann (1992) developed a composite measure of 
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state and church proximity based on thirteen variables, covering 18 European states. Jonathan Fox’ “Re-
ligion and State” dataset (Round 2) represents the most comprehensive dataset of its kind in terms of 
country coverage (177 countries), and detail (151 variables). The data has been compiled on a yearly basis 
since 1990. The index on government involvement in religion comprises of fourteen categories, ranging 
from hostile to a religious state. Table 9 lists where Argentina, South Africa, Poland and Chile are ranked 
on Fox’s government involvement in religion index. 
 
Table 9. State/Church Relationship contrasted with Pattern of Sexual Rights Regulations 
Pattern of moral regula-
tion 
Country State/church Relationship 
 
permissive 
Argentina Active State Religion (11) 
South Africa Accommodation (4) 
Restrictive Chile Preferred (9) 
Poland Multi-tiered preferences (8) 
Note: Data Source: The Religion and State Project Round 2 (Jonathan Fox). Variable used: SBX* “Official Govern-
ment Involvement in Religion” 
 
The four countries cover a wide range of legal ties between state and religious institutions. South Africa 
scores lowest, with the state merely accommodating religion while Argentina has the highest score, clas-
sified as possessing an active state religion by Fox. Chile and Poland’s ranking in between the other two 
shows that formal state/church relations cannozt explain Argentina’s and South Africa’s more permissive 
policies. In the case of South Africa, the merely accomodationist state/church relations would even make 
us expect the most restrictive policies. 
Interestingly, these findings are in line with newer case study evidence that suggests it is not the formal 
state/church relationship that determines policy output, but rather the informal aspects of the nexus be-
tween religious institutions and the state that build the decisive opportunity structures for religious influ-
ence on policy. 
Informal state/church relationship. Newer comparative case studies stress the influence of 
historically developed patterns of conflict and cooperation between state and church that can foster or 
hinder churches’ abilities to influence policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015, 2015b; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; 
Knill & Preidel, 2014; Warner, 1961). These historical characteristics of state/church interaction can be 
independent from the formal or legal relationship between the two. Arguments on the role of the informal 
state/church relationship are based on a completely different logic than those relating to formal ties be-
tween them. As discussed above, a formal closeness between the two institutions is expected to decrease 
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church’s abilities to exert influence. However, scholars studying the informal aspects of this relationship 
find such informal cooperation to actually increase church influence on policies. 
Hennig’s (2012) detailed study on abortion, artificial insemination and same-sex partnership in Poland, 
Italy and Spain focuses on the interplay of religion and politics to account for the diverging regulatory 
approaches of those three countries. Hennig argues that a historically evolved pattern of conflict or coop-
eration between state and church impacts upon the contemporary interaction between political and reli-
gious actors. According to her, the critical distance of state and church in Spain allowed for politicians to 
opt for confrontation with the church in the policy processes. However, a culture of cooperation in Poland 
and Italy, make a reform towards permissiveness of morality policies less likely, as politicians ultimately 
shy away from opposing church views out of tradition and respect for the church’s moral authority (p. 388f.). 
Among other factors, Htun (2003) also underlines the importance of the informal state/church relations. 
Employing an institutional perspective in her study on abortion, divorce and family policies in Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile, she stresses the importance of liberal issue networks whose successes in influencing 
policy is contingent upon their fit with state institutions. She argues the state/church relationship to be 
among the various factors determining this fit. As a result, Htun (2003, p. 12) points out “that conflict 
between church and state create a window of opportunity for change, while Church-state cooperation 
precludes it”. In the case of Chile, Htun (3003, p. 8) argues that “church-state collaboration posed an 
obstacle to divorce. Chile’s progressive Church helped usher in the transition to democracy and was seen 
to play a crucial role in the consolidation of democratic rule and the protection of human rights.” 
In a recent study by Grzymala-Busse (2015) on the influence of religious institutions on morality policy in 
Poland, Croatia, Canada, the US, Italy and Ireland, the author argues that the degree of fusion between 
national and political identities shapes churches’ moral authority. A fusion between these two identities 
emerges historically in the genesis of the nation. A high degree of fusion translates into high moral author-
ity, which churches can use as a political resource to shape policy. Grzymala-Busse accordingly explains 
that the restrictive morality policies in Poland are due to the merging of Polish national identity with 
Catholicism that grants high moral authority and with that great policy influence to the Catholic Church there.  
Of the many important insights from these studies, the most crucial to this study concerns the informal 
aspects of state/church relations, such as cultures of cooperation and conflict to matter and, more practi-
cally, that religious influence on policy in Poland and Chile is enabled by the close ideological ties between 
state and church. Both Hennig (2012) and Grzymala-Busse (2015) assert that a high degree of moral au-
thority of the Catholic Church in Poland makes politicians willing to conform to the church’s policy prefer-
ences. Quite similarly, in the case of Chile, Htun (2003) has underlined the important role the Chilean Catholic 
Church played in bringing about democracy that led to state/church cooperation under democracy. 
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Applying these insights to the question of why Argentina and South Africa reformed their sexual rights 
policies against church preferences after democratisation (while policies remained mostly restrictive in 
Chile and Poland) brings us closer to answering the research question. If informal state/church coopera-
tion channelled the church’s doctrinal preferences into policy in both Chile and Poland, could an (infor-
mal) split between state and church in South Africa and Argentina block the influence of institutionalised 
religion in these cases? 
Whilst not looking at policy influence but rather explaining how churches choose their political allies, we 
largely owe the insight that state/church alliances can change when a regime changes to a study by Warner 
(1961). Warner explains the behaviour of the Catholic Church in Italy and France after World War II, 
with a recourse to the churches’ behaviour during Fascism. She asserts that the church neither opposed 
nor aligned with Fascism in Italy, allowing the church’s reputation to remain intact. Therefore the Catholic 
Church in Italy emerged as a legitimate ally for the Christian Democratic Party during democratic consol-
idation. In France, on the other hand, the church overly mingled with the Vichy regime, which Warner 
suggests to be the reason the tentative alliance between the church and the Christian Party in post-war 
France turned out to be unstable and faded away. 
Thus, while informal state/church relations develop historically, they are not necessarily stable over time. 
As Warner has shown, church behaviour during World War II Fascism has shaped political alliances for 
the churches post-fascism. A possible contention could be that the close ties between the apartheid regime 
in South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina created unfavourable opportunity structures for 
the church’s influence post-democratisation, which would imply a dramatic transformation of informal 
state/church relations during democratisation. Is a close relationship between state and church during 
authoritarianism key to understand the surprising patterns of sexual rights regulations in South Africa and 
Argentina today? Or more specifically, do the close ties between state and church during the last authori-
tarian regimes block religious influence on sexual rights policies in South Africa and Argentina today? If 
so, how does a causal mechanism connecting cause and outcome look like? 
 
Conclusion and implications 
Across the scope of reviewing sexual rights policies in the four third-wave democratisation countries of 
Argentina, South Africa, Chile and Poland, we see that the former two regulate very permissively, having 
some of the most permissive sexual rights policies worldwide. In contrast, the latter two belong to the 
most restrictively regulating countries. Chile and Poland’s sexual rights policies are in line with expecta-
tions derived from most of the prominent theories in morality policy research. Regulatory approaches of 
both countries reflect conservative attitudes towards abortion and homosexuality in the population, which 
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also corresponds with high levels of adherence to a religious denomination with a conservative moral 
outlook (Catholicism), and a very high and high church attendance rate in Poland and Chile, respectively. 
In fact, Chile and Poland are often the prime examples of religious influence on policy in studies on the 
subject (e.g. Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003). 
In contrast, when considering the empirical data on Argentina and South Africa, we see a most puzzling 
picture. While having similar or even higher rates of conservative stances concerning these issues in their 
populations than Chile and Poland, both countries regulate sexual rights issues permissively. Furthermore, 
just as their restrictively regulating counterparts, Argentina’s and South Africa’s populations predomi-
nantly adhere to religious denominations with conservative moral stances. Additionally, people attend 
church roughly equally as often in Argentina as they do in Chile, and even slightly more in South Africa as 
they do in Poland.  
Reviewing prominent theories in the literature on morality policies, Chile and Poland’s restrictive regu-
lations are not surprising. However, Argentina and South Africa’s regulatory patterns are curious to say 
the least. The question that flows from the regulation of abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR in South 
Africa and Argentina is threefold.  
- First, why do they display a permissive pattern of moral regulations where we would expect them 
to regulate as restrictively as Chile and Poland do?  
- Second, rather than moving incrementally towards more permissive policies, if they reformed 
regulations, the changes were extreme and sudden. Why did both countries jump from restrictive 
regulatory status quos to very permissive options without major intermediate steps? 
- Third, Argentina’s abortion regulation deviates from the generally permissive pattern of sexual 
rights policies in the country, as well as from the succession of rights observed in Europe where 
countries granted reproductive rights decades before LGBT rights. 
Despite these unusual patterns of regulations in South Africa and Argentina, there is a striking omission of 
scholarship concerning these countries in morality policy literature. With few notable exceptions, the vast 
majority of studies have focused on the European and US context, often even defining morality policy 
change as a Western phenomenon. As the policies in South Africa and Argentina clearly illustrate, this 
focus is no longer justified. However, a study on sexual rights policy in South Africa and Argentina does 
not simply fill a gap in the literature in terms of overlooked geographic and cultural contexts. Looking at 
cases in which religious influence on policy is absent despite widespread religious conservativism also con-
tributes to the literature canon by helping to refine existing theory on religious influence on policy. In 
light of what studies on morality policy and religion and politics have taught us and also considering that 
even in the most secular societies, rites of passage such as births, weddings, and funerals are still celebrated 
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in religious terms, the question we need to ask now is not why churches matter but how church influence 
can be defeated. 
An exciting new body of research has ventured into the concrete pathways and mechanisms through which 
religious doctrine can translate into policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; Knill 
& Preidel, 2014). What remains unexplored, however, is how religious institutions can be blocked from 
influencing policy in highly religious contexts. In short, we are lacking a mechanism of religious defeat. 
This study aims to fill this gap. 
A mechanism of religious blockage is not simply an inversion of a mechanism of religious influence. Both 
solve different questions and require a focus on different actors. For instance, Grzymala-Busse (2015), 
aims to solve the question whether churches can influence policy in secular states at all. Her argument is 
that a fusion of national and political identities fosters churches’ moral authority. The proposed causal 
chain is that churches with high moral authority can gain institutional access to the political system, ena-
bling them to influence policies through the sordid backroom of politics. With less moral authority, she 
argues, churches only have the option to form less effective party alliances. Finally, Grzymala-Busse (2015, 
p. 13) posits that no moral authority means there is no mechanism of religious influence. 
However, it is worth adding that the simple absence of a mechanism of religious influence doesn’t suffi-
ciently explain why permissive policies are passed, and precisely how religious institutions can be blocked 
from exerting influence. A mechanism explaining permissive policy output must give recognition to social 
movements as the main antagonists of religious institutions, and must contain a substantiation of how these 
social movements manage to overpower religious influence – often against all odds. 
This study will attempt to build on the portentous insights provided by existing studies that contend 
informal state/church relations, although formed historically but often unstable over time, to be signifi-
cant for policy output and that alliances with authoritarian regimes reduce the chances of churches to 
allying with political parties after regime change. The following chapter will develop a causal chain that 
leads from close ties between state and church during authoritarian rule to permissive sexual rights policy 
outputs today. 
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3 Hypothesising a Causal Mechanism: From Ideological  
Symbiosis to Sexual Rights Policy 
 
Having identified the informal aspects of the state/church relationship during South Africa and Ar-
gentina’s last authoritarian regime as the potential causal condition for sexual rights policy output, 
what we are still missing is a detailed conceptualisation of an empirically testable mechanism causally 
connecting these two phenomena. 
According to Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 29),  a causal mechanism for a process tracing study should 
be conceptualised “as a series of parts composed of entities engaging in activities” such that the causal 
mechanism represents a theory that is composed of interlocking parts that transmit causal forces from X 
to Y (ibid. p. 29). Such a conception is useful as it necessitates us to be explicit about the actors as well as 
the actions that bring about change (transmitting causal force). Figure 1 visualises the hypothesised causal 
chain consisting of the causal condition that triggers three intermediate steps, eventually leading to the 
outcome of permissive sexual rights policies. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesised Causal Mechanism 
Source: Own illustration. 
  
 - 36 - 
As illustrated in Figure 1, what triggers the mechanism to unfold is a mutually beneficial ideological rela-
tionship between church and state, which I term ‘ideological symbiosis’, during authoritarian rule. This 
leads to permissive sexual rights policy output in third-wave democratisation countries because the demise 
of the former regime goes hand in hand with a delegitimation of religious influence on politics. If a religious 
institution has become complicit in the ideological legitimation of the regime and its human rights abusing 
practices, then religion can no longer be used as a tool for identification and legitimation after democratisation. 
Thus, the newly democratic regime needs to look for an alternative source of political and moral legitimacy. 
Human rights, the most legitimate principle of the time of third-wave democratisations, then functionally 
replace religious principles as the meta-source of moral values for politics and thus the focus of the nascent 
democratic identity of the country. A constitutional identity focused on a secular interpretation of human 
rights creates favourable political opportunity structures for social movements wishing to push for policy 
change. Social movement actors can frame their claims as human rights issues and their liberation as a 
litmus test for the credibility of the new democratic government’s commitment to the constitutional iden-
tity. As a result, politicians face rhetorical entrapment in that their commitment to human rights demands 
the mitigation of current human rights violations by passing sexual rights policies. All the while, religiously 
based counter arguments can easily be dismissed as non-democratic and diametrically opposed to human 
rights. This proposition will become clearer as we explore further in more detail below. 
Process tracing is a qualitative method that allows for a context sensitive, in-depth analysis of the causal 
mechanism that connects cause and effect within a specific case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch & 
Palier, 2016). Process tracing is particularly useful for “obtaining an explanation for deviant cases” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, pp. 214–215) and it is the method of choice whenever the researcher is assessing “not 
only whether something mattered or made a difference but also how exactly it influenced the outcome.” 
While comparative methods are based on the logic of variation and co-variation of potential causes and 
effects across cases, causality in process tracing is established by evaluating the congruency between pre-
dicted information and actual empirical information for each part of a hypothesised causal chain within a 
case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 4). Employing process tracing as a method for the analysis of Argentina 
and South Africa enables a thorough test of the unfolding of the hypothesised mechanism in both cases, 
and therefore rule out mere coincidental covariation between hypothesised cause and outcome. 
The drawback of process tracing as a stand-alone-approach is that inferences are limited to the case(s) 
under study. “On its own merits, a single process-tracing theory test is unable to produce any cross-case 
inferences but can only update our confidence in the presence/absence of a causal mechanism in a partic-
ular case, enabling strong within-case inferences to be made but not cross-case inferences.” (ibid., p. 152) 
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For inferences across a broader set of cases, process tracing needs to be combined with cross-case com-
parison. Carrying out process tracing in two cases rather than one adds a comparative element to process 
tracing as a single case method, and suggests a broader scope of applicability for the theoretical proposi-
tion. South Africa and Argentina are geographically and politically independent cases, and establishing a 
common causal mechanism in these very different contexts suggests a strong case for the mechanism’s 
explanatory potential beyond those two cases. The conclusion of this study will explore the theoretical 
proposition’s suitability to other cases as well. 
Currently, various types of process tracing exist. Beach and Pedersen recommend what they call theory 
testing process tracing whenever existing theories allow to add and order the components of a causal 
process and thus allow the researcher to create a hypothesised causal mechanism that can be tested (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2013, p. 65). Following some more elaboration on process tracing, the remainder of this 
chapter fleshes out the macro-historical mechanism. This will be done by drawing on the insights and 
concepts of qualitative studies on the religious influence on politics, and complement them with concepts 
originating in historical institutionalism as well as social movement theory. 
 
3.1 Process Tracing 
While the tracing of causal processes is part of most small-n research designs, process tracing has devel-
oped as a distinct approach of analysis in political science in recent years (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 
p. 79). Its rapidly growing popularity has encouraged many scholarly contributions in the field of qualita-
tive methods, aiming to more strongly define the somewhat fuzzy usage of the term as a label for any study 
that includes some type of causal narrative into a distinct stand-alone research approach with its own in-
ferential logic, terminology and best practice rules (among the most important contributions on process 
tracing methodology are (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Bennett, 2008; Bennett & Checkel, 2015; George 
& Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, 2012; Hall, 2008; Mahoney, 2010, 2012; 
Rohlfing, 2012; Trampusch & Palier, 2016; Waldner, 2012). 
Ironically, increased scholarly interest in recent years in shaping process tracing into a stand-alone method 
has led to the development of heterogeneous and sometimes even incommensurable definitions and views 
about what process tracing is and best practices when applied to research. In a recent overview article 
about process tracing, Trampusch and Palier (2016, p. 438) identify 18 different variants of this method and 
describe “the current situation as one of internal debate, considerable disagreement, and occasional confusion.” 
Starting with an abstraction from the diverging views on process tracing, it has become generally agreed 
that it is a method for in-depth case study research that allows for within-case causal inference by focusing 
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on the processes that link causes to their effects (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 23; Blatter & Haverland, 
2012, p. 81). Consequently, process tracing can help opening up the black box of causality (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). This is done by theorising a chain of events that, in tem-
poral and logical succession, lead from cause to effect (see Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, Brady, & 
Seawright, 2004; George & Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2003). 
Most of the contributions in qualitative methods point out that the logic under which causal inferences are 
drawn in process tracing differs from the variance/co-variance logic that underpins quantitative research 
designs (as well as small-n comparative methods). As most prominently expressed by King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994, p. 129), causality can be established based on the co-variation between values of X and Y 
across a range of cases. This understanding of causality is particularly useful when the research aim is 
finding the average effect of a variable across a population of cases. On the other hand, process tracing 
aims to specify the processes which causally connect independent and dependent variables within individ-
ual cases (Hall, 2008, p. 306). Causality in process tracing is established through an assessment of the 
empirical fingerprints left by a causal theory within a case. In other words, empirical information is eval-
uated by whether it suggests a hypothesised causal connection to be present or not. Thus, causal inferences 
in process tracing are drawn based on a careful comparison between predicted evidence (what we predict 
to find if the hypothesised causal relation is true) and actual evidence (what is actually revealed in empirical 
reality), (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Rohlfing, 2012).  
The empirical information required for process tracing as a case-based research approach differs from 
quantitative research. Collier and Brady (2004, 2010, pp. 184–188) coined the term “causal process ob-
servations” (CPOs) to distinguish the type of empirical evidence required for qualitative research from the 
“data-set observations” (DSOs) that need to be gathered for variance-based designs. DSOs are “an insight 
or piece of data that provides information about the context or mechanism and contributes a different kind 
of leverage in causal inference. It does not necessarily do so as part of a larger, systematized array of 
observations” (ibid. 2010, pp. 184–185). Rather, it sheds light onto causal mechanisms and is an indis-
pensable supplement and/or alternative to variance-based inference. Other than the data matrices ana-
lysed by quantitative researchers, CPOs do not have to be in any particular standardised form. This means 
CPOs can take on the form of qualitative but also of numerical information (Collier, 2011, p. 825). While 
many scholars use different terminology for the empirical information required for process tracing, there 
is a general consensus that it differs from the empirical information used in other types of research. As a 
result, most scholars refer to the concept of CPOs when coining their own terminology, e.g. Bennett 
(2008) using the term “process tracing observations” and Beach and Pedersen (2013) using the term “evidence”. 
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The variant of process tracing employed in the present study is what Beach and Pedersen (2013) call “the-
ory-testing process tracing”. In this variant the researcher deduces a theory from the existing literature 
and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a 
given case, enabling within-case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the 
case (...) (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 2–3). 
The aim of this variant of process tracing is to verify the presence or absence of a hypothesised causal 
mechanism in a specific case. Through a diligent application of this method, the prior certainty of the 
existence of the mechanism in the case can be updated or disconfirmed. However, no inferences regarding 
a broader set of cases can be done without combining process tracing with other methods. 
Each part of the hypothesised mechanism needs to be tested separately and the failure to demonstrate the 
existence of even just one part of the mechanism disconfirms the presence of the whole mechanism. Need-
less to say, each part of the theorised mechanism needs to be fastidiously translated into empirically ob-
servable manifestations. Thus, the researcher needs to reflect about what empirical traces could increase 
(or decrease) confidence in the presence of the mechanism prior to data collection. The expected empir-
ical information is then compared with the actual empirical information. 
It is important to note that pieces of empirical information differ with regards their inferential leverage. 
It is useful to think of the logic of process tracing as similar to criminology. In a murder case, finding a 
suspect at the scene of crime holding a smoking gun is normally a more valuable piece of evidence than 
finding a suspect’s DNA in the victim’s apartment. While few alternative explanations could account for 
a suspect being caught at the crime scene with the murder weapon in hand, more plausible explanations 
could be put forward to account for the DNA traces. For instance, the victim and suspect could have been 
friends, which means the suspect has probably visited the apartment before, leaving DNA traces without 
necessarily being the murderer. Consequently, a smoking gun would allow the identification of the mur-
derer unambiguously, while the DNA traces would not. However, the latter is more likely to be found by 
a detective than a coincidental stumbling across a smoking gun. If the detective is not as lucky as to be 
presented with unequivocal evidence, she has to collect an array of weaker types of evidence from which, 
taken altogether, she infers that the suspect is indeed the murderer beyond a reasonable amount of doubt. 
In order to determine the inferential leverage of pieces of information, process tracing scholars (e.g. 
Beach and Pederson 2013; Bennett 2010; Collier 2011) suggest using four types of empirical tests that 
build on the work of van Evera (1997). Each of the four tests – doubly decisive test, smoking gun test, 
hoop test, straw in the wind test - possess a unique combination of high/low theoretical certainty and 
high/low theoretical uniqueness. In these tests, certainty refers to the veracity or positive identification 
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of particular evidence if the mechanism is present. Uniqueness refers to whether the presence of a cer-
tain piece of evidence can uniquely discriminate between the hypothesised part of the mechanism and alter-
native explanations. 
A doubly decisive test is the strongest of all four tests as it combines high certainty with high uniqueness. In this 
case, the researcher can be certain that if the piece of evidence is not found, the mechanism is not present 
(certainty) and if it is found, it cannot be caused by something else than the mechanism (uniqueness). 
A ‘smoking gun’ refers to a piece of evidence that has high uniqueness. Should the test reveal that the 
evidence indeed is found, it follows that the specific part of the mechanism is surely present. Its name 
metaphorically draws from classic criminology where a detective finding a suspect with the smoking gun 
in hand provides overwhelming evidence that this person is indeed the murderer. However, a smoking 
gun test possesses low theoretical certainty; if the gun is not found, this does not prove the suspect is not 
guilty. Thus, while the presence of a smoking gun is telling regarding the presence of one part of the 
mechanism, the absence of a smoking gun is not allowing inferences regarding the absence of that part of 
the mechanism. 
Conversely, a hoop test works the other way around. It has high certainty in that evidence is very likely 
to be found if the mechanism is present, but a piece of evidence in a hoop test cannot discriminate between 
the presence of the mechanism and other potential causes. 
Finally, a straw in the wind test represents rather weak evidence in that it has both a low uniqueness and 
a low certainty. In itself the presence of evidence of this kind does not allow for causal inference. Such a 
test only becomes stronger when combined with other stronger types of evidence or in the presence of 
many Straw in the Wind tests, and when taken together make the presence of the mechanism plausible. 
Table 10 sums up the four test types and the inferential leverage they possess. 
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Table 10. Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference 
  Theoretical Certainty 







1.Straw in the Wind 
 
a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hy-
pothesis, but does not confirm it. 
b. Failing: Hypothesis is not elimi-
nated, but slightly weakened. 
3. Smoking Gun 
 
a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis. 
b. Failing: Hypothesis is not 






a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hy-
pothesis, but does not confirm it. 
b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis. 
4. Doubly Decisive  
 
a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis 
and eliminates others. 
b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.  
Source: Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013: 103) and Collier (2011: 825). Collier himself builds on Bennett 
(2010: 210) who in turn builds on categories formulated by Van Evera (1997, 31–32). 
 
3.2 Causal Condition. State/Church Ideological Symbiosis during 
Authoritarian Rule 
The hypothesised causal condition that sets off the mechanism leading to permissive sexual rights policies 
after democratisation is an ideological symbiosis between state and church during authoritarian rule. Ide-
ological symbiosis is a mutually beneficial alliance between state and church that includes the regime con-
structing its political identity as based on religion; and the church supporting this regime. What is ex-
changed is legitimacy for political influence; the regime gaining the former, granting the latter to the 
church in return. Such symbiosis can only grow in religious societies. Both institutions collude in using 
this societal importance of religion to justify increased church influence as well as the regime’s style of 
rule. Ideological symbiosis is a type of informal state/church relationship that differs from the official 
institutional ties captured by measures of state/church or state-religion closeness such as the ones by Fox 
(2011) or Chavez and Cann (1992) and it can occur independently from formal classification criteria. 
Ideological symbiosis is present when a) the state employs arguments based on religion to construct its claims 
of legitimacy, and when b) the church readily accepts this framing and supports the authoritarian regime. 
At least since Max Weber, the legitimacy of political rule has been a central topic in political science and 
political sociology. According to Weber, systems of power “establish and cultivate the belief in its legiti-
macy” (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1979, p. 213). The belief in the legitimacy of authority is directly linked 
to a system’s stability. Legitimate authority is less ‘costly’ than any other form of authority because it does 
not need to be enforced through force or rewards (Matheson, 1994, p. 157). Generally, the concept of 
 - 42 - 
legitimacy denotes the acknowledgement or recognition of something or someone as rightful and appro-
priate. “Deployed by students of national legal systems, the concept of legitimacy is often used to postulate 
and explain what, other than a command and its enforcement, is required to create a propensity among 
the citizens generally to obey the rulers and the rules.” (Franck, 1990, p. 16) 
Divinely derived legitimacy has proven particularly appealing to statesmen across the ages. The advantages 
of religion as a source of political legitimacy are threefold. First, it exempts political rulers from having to 
prove their claim to authority. God cannot be proven and neither can God’s will, and thus support from 
religious institutions constitutes a convenient source of credibility. Second, political rulers and regimes 
can benefit from religion’s claim to transcendental or divine sanction and reward. Exploiting the belief in 
punishment or reward in the afterlife can be a powerful political coercion mechanism. Third, religions 
often offer a readily available infrastructure to spread (political) ideology to the masses. Through mass and 
other religious activities, church officials can reach even very remote parts of a country and directly influ-
ence all sections of the population. Priests, for example, preaching in support or against specific political 
ideas or leaders, can be an invaluable resource for politicians. All in all, the support from religious author-
ities or even an overlap between religious and state authorities can be a cost-effective and desirable source 
of political legitimacy. 
Equally, religious institutions can benefit from lending legitimacy to political leaders. From the oppor-
tunity to influence policy according to church doctrine to securing financial support and other privileges, 
there is a lot to gain for religious institutions by cooperating with the state. However, as Grzymala-Busse 
(2015) contends, mingling with politics can also be a dangerous route for churches. She argues that a 
church’s moral authority and its ability to influence policy can suffer from alliances with political parties 
as it can lead the church to being perceived as engaging in party politicking, rather than working for the 
common good of the nation. More generally, “moral authority can be squandered by failing to live up to 
standards the churches set for themselves, the standards by which they were judged worthy of authority 
in the first place.” (Grzymala-Busse, 2015, p. 39) In other words, churches’ moral authority can be de-
stroyed by actions regarded as immoral. For instance, the paedophilia scandal in the Irish Catholic Church 
has damaged the traditionally high moral authority of the Church there (ibid.). It is not hard to imagine 
that an ideological symbiosis with a human rights abusing authoritarian regime such as the apartheid regime 
or the Argentine military dictatorship is regarded as very immoral; and such alliance to damage moral 
authority of churches. 
For a symbiosis to be present it is necessary that both parties, state and church, are willingly involved. 
Chile can serve as an illustration of the conceptual boundaries of ideological symbiosis. In Chile, the Pino-
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chet regime used religious rhetoric but the Catholic Church rejected ideological entanglement. The mili-
tary junta that came to power in Chile after a coup in 1973 justified its regime with a defence of Western 
Christian values against Marxism and proclaimed the regime’s economic policies to be an application of 
social principles formulated by the Pope (Sigmund, 1986, p. 32). However, these sympathies proved to 
be unilateral as the Bishops Conference called for a restoration of democracy and criticised the regime for 
human rights abuses (ibid., p.33). The Catholic Church in Chile became the only institution that publicly 
criticised the violent repression of the regime, establishing the moral opposition against the dictatorship 
(Huntington, 1991a, p. 33). Thus, Chile did not have an ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule. 
Rather, the Chilean Catholic Church challenged the military dictatorship and earned considerable moral 
authority during democratisation and thereafter. 
Only when both state and church have actively allied, the causal condition of the mechanism is met. Thus, 
only such an active alliance triggers the onset of the causal mechanism. A relationship that was contested 
by one of the parties or that was more ambiguous and less visible would not become a disadvantage for a 
church under a new regime. That is the case because the discreteness of church influence rests on the 
potential of political opponents to use the immoral symbiosis to challenge religious influence on political 
matters under a new regime. 
 
3.3 Causal Mechanism Part 1. Constitutional Identity based on Human Rights 
An ideological symbiosis between state and church in the past has important repercussions for a country’s 
democratic present. The core argument here is that for third-wave democratisation countries, a past im-
moral alliance between these two institutions leads to the emergence of a new constitutional identity after 
democratisation that excludes religion and is rather based on a secular interpretation of human rights; the 
ladder functioning as a kind of political ersatz-religion. This then provides the legal and ideological context 
in which struggles about sexual rights policies take place later on and are the subject of subsequent parts 
of the causal mechanism. 
 
The international normative context of third wave democratisation 
Before unpacking the causal connection that forms this first part of the causal chain, we will need to first 
consider the international normative context of third wave democratisations, as it forms an important 
scope condition for the mechanism. 
One of the reasons for the third wave of democratisation was a deepening legitimacy crisis of authoritarian 
regimes in a global environment in which a focus on democracy and human rights was rapidly embraced 
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in the international community (Huntington, 1991b, p. 45). Since the end of WWII, the criteria for what 
constitutes legitimate government has evolved to be the protection of human rights, rather than territorial 
sovereignty alone (Selznick, 2008, p. 49). What’s more, by the time of the third wave of democratisation, 
the international discourse was shifting to include both reproductive and LGBT rights in the scope of 
human rights protection. 
For instance, the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and includes affirmations about women’s 
reproductive rights. It is important to note, however, that assertions of reproductive rights in international 
human rights treaties, including CEDAW, leave ample room for interpretation when it comes to abortion. 
This is the result of abortion being a hotly debated subject, often rejected on cultural and religious 
grounds. Therefore, a right to abortion would not obtain intercultural consensus. Even the less conten-
tious notion of reproductive rights triggered more countries to enter reservations to their ratification to 
CEDAW than for any other human rights treaty (Steiner, Alston, & Goodman, 2008, p. 185). 
While different interpretations of sexual and reproductive rights have existed from the earliest stages of 
the international human rights discourse, a clash between religious and secular interpretations became 
increasingly visible at the 1995 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). 
The link between religion and these rights was actively discussed and several Muslim-majority and Cath-
olic-majority countries, as well as the Holy See voiced reservations about provisions regarding sexual and 
reproductive rights in the Program of Action adopted at the Cairo Conference (United Nations Population 
Fund, 2016, p. 24). The ICPD does not include a right to abortion, but rather underlines the need for 
safe, affordable and effective health services, including reproductive health care. However, since the Cairo 
conference, abortion rights have “become a marker whether states are committed to women’s reproduc-
tive rights” (Rebouche, 2011, p. 12). 
LGBT rights explicitly found their way into international human rights discourse when the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against Northern Ireland’s sodomy law in 1981 (Dudgeon vs. The United King-
dom). A similar case in the UN framework took place when the former UN Committee of Human Rights 
(UNCHR) struck down Tasmania’s sodomy law in 1994 (Toonen vs. Australia) (Sanders, 2002). After that 
landmark decision, other UN bodies declared that their respective treaties also apply to sexual minorities, 
among them the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee 
against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Lau, 2004, p. 1702). 
Legal gender recognition specifically was first acknowledged as a human right in the case of Lydia Foy in 
Ireland. Registered as a boy at birth, Dr Lydia Foy unsuccessfully tried to obtain a new birth certificate 
reflecting her female gender. After years of legal struggle, an Irish High Court Judge declared in 2007 that 
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the lack of LGR policy in Ireland is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (Farrell, 
2012). In the same year, a group of international human rights experts created the Yogyakarta Principles, 
the most important document for the incorporation of LGBT rights into international human rights. The 
principles feature the application of existing international human rights standards on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. Although not legally binding, they have influenced jurisprudence, practices and laws 
addressing discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. The UN High Commission for 
Refugees now cites these principles in its guideline for the protection of refugees (ISHR, 2016). 
In 2010, then U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for defending the human rights of LGBT people 
imprisoned for their sexual orientation, and on a different occasion in the same year he rallied against 
homophobic bullying (Gary & Rubin, 2012). A report titled “The United Nations Speak Out: Tackling 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, jointly published by the U.N. 
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) and the Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
in 2011 serves as an illustration that LGBT rights as human rights have become mainstream in the UN 
human rights framework (Gary & Rubin, 2012). However, the fact that several delegates left the room 
when Hillary Clinton famously proclaimed that gay rights are human rights, during a speech at the United 
Nations’ Palais des Nations in Geneva in 2011, shows that this notion is still strongly contested (Patel, 2015). 
While both reproductive and LGBT rights have featured prominently in the international human rights 
discourse over the years, they remain contested and up to each respective state to interpret and enforce 
whether human rights include reproductive and LGBT rights. This circumspect interpretation is contin-
gent upon the cultural, religious and political context of the state which can be shaped by past and current 
alliance structures with religious institutions. 
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Democratisation as critical juncture for constitutional identity 
As Smith (1991, p. 99) argues, an alteration of the political regime always marks a shift in the national 
identity of states. In that sense, a regime change can be conceptualised as a critical juncture in the identity 
of a country. The constitutional identity of countries is a specific political identity that is, while not inde-
pendent, conceptually distinct from national identity. As Jacobsohn (2006, p. 363) contends, constitu-
tional identity “emerges dialogically and represents a mix of political aspirations and commitments that is 
expressive of a nation's past, as well as the determination of those within the society who seek, in some 
ways, to transcend that past.” His conception of constitutional identity rests on the understanding of con-
stitutions as the foundation for social and legal relations of a polity (ibid. p.364). 
Constitutional identities are constructed within and by the political system. They contain more than the 
text of constitutions but also how this text relates to the national identity, how it is interpreted by the 
judicial and political system, and what narratives it contains about the essence of the nation and how the 
current form of government relates to that. It is central to the political legitimacy of governments as it 
translates certain aspects of the nation’s characteristics into claims of legitimacy for a particular form of 
government. Further, the constitutional identity sets the boundaries for what is recognised as a legitimate 
argument in political debates and constrains possible policy choices to what is considered appropriate given 
the fundamental values of the nation and constitution. What Smith (1991, p. 144) contends about national 
identity is also true for constitutional identity as I use it here; it “determines not only the composition of 
the regime’s personnel, but also legitimizes and often influences policy goals and administrative practices 
that regulate everyday lives of each citizen.” (Smith, 1991, p. 144) 
Regime changes constitute critical junctures in the constitutional identity of a country. In the words of 
Collier and Collier (1991, pp. 29–30), “[a] critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant 
change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (…) and which is hypothesised to 
produce distinct legacies.” When countries face such a juncture, the chosen path depends on various con-
textual and historical factors of that country. 
The antecedent condition of state/church ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule should make it 
less likely that religion will become part of the ideological fabric of the new regime. The constitutional 
identity that takes shape during democratisation then sets off path dependent processes because that new 
identity becomes institutionalised in law and practice and forms the legal and normative context for forth-
coming policy battles. 
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The critical juncture here consists of the following three elements 
1. the state/church relationship during authoritarian rule as the antecedent condition 
2. the democratic regime change as the trigger   
3. the timing of third wave democratisations as a scope condition that becomes paramount as it 
provides a specific international normative context.  
How exactly does the state/church nexus of the past produce a particular constitutional identity in the 
context of third wave democratisation? In that context, more than ever, authoritarian regimes are highly 
dependent on performance legitimacy that could easily disappear in the event of economic crisis, military 
defeat and the like (Huntington, 1991b, p. 45). What is essential is that third wave democratisations are 
the result of eroding regime legitimacy. If institutionalised religion supported the old regime, a simulta-
neous decrease in the legitimacy of religious influence on governance can be expected. It seems likely that 
this precludes churches to become politically influential in the new democracy. A similar dynamic has 
already been described by Warner (1961), who argued that the Catholic Church in France was too closely 
associated with the Vichy regime, which impeded successful political alliances after WWII. 
In the volatile times of regime change and democratic consolidation, a newly democratic regime needs to 
gain and project legitimacy, both locally and globally. A nascent regime’s legitimacy is an important driv-
ing force in the ratification of human rights treaties (Beetham, 2008, p. 115). Neoinstitutionalists, sociol-
ogists and constructivist political scientists have argued that by ratifying human rights treaties, states can 
represent themselves “as normal and legitimate actors to the broad international community and to their 
own citizens.” (Zhou, 2014, p. 480)  
The absence of religion as the highest normative principle should make a state more receptive for human 
rights norms than states that are normatively saturated. Human rights can become a kind of political ersatz-
religion in that they functionally replace religious doctrine as the highest source of moral standards for 
government action. The state/church ideological symbiosis of the past should thus not only heighten the 
degree to which human rights are embraced by the country, but also shape what kind of interpretation of 
human rights prevails. If religious influence on governance has become discredited, religious institutions 
should not be able to steer a country’s drive towards embracing human rights away from a secular and 
inclusive interpretation; the direction the international human rights discourse was taking at the time of 
third-wave democratisations. This proposition remains to be tested.  
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Empirical manifestations 
The main argument of this section of the mechanism that requires empirical testing is that a state/church 
ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule leads to the emergence of a constitutional identity that is 
based on a secular interpretation of human rights. An appropriate empirical test of this causal connection 
needs to demonstrate two findings: 
1. that the new constitutional identity does indeed rests on (secular) human rights 
2. that religion has been replaced by human rights as the legitimising value system of the political system.  
There is a strong element of temporality in that the test can only be successful if the new constitutional 
identity is considered new, i.e. when it differs from the previous regime’s ideologies. As a result, this 
requires a within-case comparison between constitutional identity pre and post-democratisation. 
Useful empirical data regarding the constitutional identity and its foundational values can be found in the fol-
lowing areas: a. constitutional texts (the content as well as the political discussions involved in the passage of 
the constitution); b. the ratification of human rights treaties; c. a country’s behaviour in international human 
rights related organisations; d. symbolic political communication (inaugural speeches, high profile state visits, 
etc.); and e. public communication by churches (press statements, official church documents, etc.). 
A. Constitutions. While not necessarily a reflection of a country’s material reality, constitutional 
texts reflect what the drafters see as a country’s core values, aspirations and how they want the country 
to be seen by its citizens as well as the international community of states. A profound change in constitu-
tional identity should be accompanied by the passage of a whole new constitution rather than mere changes 
in interpretation. If religious principles and mentions of God have a less prominent role in the new con-
stitution than they had in the previous one, and there is an explicit focus on international law and human 
rights, this would be an indicator of a shift in constitutional identity and its underlying values. Arguably, 
this constitutes a hoop test for this part of the mechanism only, as it is quite certain to be found but the 
predicted evidence in the empirical reality of a case cannot clearly discern between causes other than the 
ideological relationship between church and the former regime. For instance, a shift from religious prin-
ciples towards human rights as the raison d‘être of government action in the constitution could also be 
caused by general secularisation and modernisation processes. To this end, four further tests will be undertaken. 
B. Human Rights Treaties. Another revealing source of information about a regime’s stance and 
emphasis on human rights are its ratification status of international human rights treaties. If a new consti-
tutional identity is founded on human rights, there ought to be a swift ratification of all major international 
human rights treaties as well as a comprehensive incorporation of the international human rights regime 
into the national political system after democratisation. This should especially be the case if human rights 
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have not featured in a major role in the country’s value system before. Finding that the country swiftly 
ratifies all major human rights treaties after the regime change is theoretically certain. Without commit-
ting to uphold human rights, such rights could hardly be part of a country’s core values. However, it is 
not theoretically unique in that most states participate more or less in the international human rights re-
gime. A better indicator of authentic commitment would be the comprehensive incorporation of human 
rights standards into national law. As was the case for constitutions, the ratification of international human 
rights treaties constitutes a hoop test which can do little more than nudge our confidence in this part of 
the mechanism, while its absence would count as disconfirming evidence. 
C. International Organisations. The degree and kind of human rights a government supports can 
be inferred from the behaviour of the country’s representatives in international organisations. Do they 
actively advocate the increasing incorporation of women’s and LGBT rights into the international human 
rights regime? Or are they only mandated to support a more conservative scope of application of human 
rights? The explicit support of more controversial rights that are incompatible with the country’s domi-
nant religious denominations’ views would be as theoretically certain as it is unique. A country with a 
religiously based constitutional identity would surely not subscribe to or even actively advance rights 
whose underlying values are mismatched with that identity. Therefore, this represents a doubly decisive test. 
D. Symbolic political communication. If religious morality was replaced by human rights as the 
legitimising principles that underpin a new regime’s identity, there should not only be traces of an in-
creased emphasis on secularly interpreted human rights, but also reduced emphasis on religion in general. 
Instances of symbolic political communication such as the content of inaugural speeches, the first demo-
cratic parliamentary sessions and high profile state visits in the early years of democratic consolidation are 
an interesting area of investigation for assessing the constitutional identity, as it is simultaneously an ex-
pression of identity and a site for its construction. The absence of religion in such instances would be an 
indicator of the regime’s legitimising value system shifting away from religion. However, if religious cus-
toms or references are frequently invoked during symbolic political events, this would count as discon-
firming evidence. Investigating whether there was an absence of religion, where it was clearly present 
before regime change, constitutes an additional hoop test for this section of the mechanism. 
E. Official church statements. Discovering signs of dissent between state and church would be more 
theoretically unique than the mere absence of religion in political events with high symbolic value. Such 
dissent could be found in various empirical materials, including official church statements, interviews with 
church leaders in newspaper articles of the time, or publications by the church itself. While dissent be-
tween those two formerly colluding institutions would uniquely point towards the erosion of a formerly 
mutually beneficial relationship, finding such evidence is not certain which makes it a smoking gun type 
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of test. State and church could be acting covertly instead of publicly, working to keep conflict at a mini-
mum in times of democratic transition and the associated turbulence of a country during large-scale 
change. Thus, not finding this type of evidence would not disconfirm this section of the mechanism. On 
the other hand, overly amicable relations between state and church would disconfirm this section. 
Table 11 sums up the constitutive components of the first part of the mechanism, the empirical infor-
mation that ought to be found to confirm that this part of the mechanism indeed unfolded as hypothesised, 
what test type finding the predicted empirical manifestations constitutes, as well as the specific data re-
quired for conducting the test. Taken together, if the empirical tests presented can be passed, this would 
considerably increase our confidence in the existence of this section of the mechanism. 
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3.4 Causal Mechanism Part 2. Legal and Discursive Opportunity Structures  
The first step of the causal mechanism hypothesises that a new constitutional identity emerges during 
democratisation to form the legal and ideological context in which actors operate during the sexual rights 
policy process. While churches are among the most vocal opponents of morality policy change towards 
permissiveness, social movements are among the most important reform proponents. Many scholars have 
highlighted the paramount importance of the LGBT rights movement for LGBT rights policies (e.g. Koll-
man, 2007; Tremblay, Paternotte, & Johnson, 2011) and of the women’s movement for abortion policy 
making (e.g. Githens & McBride Stetson, 1996). Therefore, the second section of the mechanism focusses 
on social movements and how the newly emerging constitutional identity creates favourable political op-
portunity structures for social movement actors seeking to anchor their claims onto the political agenda. 
Political opportunity structures have received considerable attention in comparative scholarship on social 
movements (Wilson, 2006, p. 326). “Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configu-
rations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which 
facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.” 
(Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58) According to Kitschelt, political opportunity structures can influence the strate-
gies through which movements advance their cause, and their ability to impact on policy decisions. 
The concept of political opportunity structures has been developed further by scholars who assess so-
called legal and discursive opportunity structures. The former designates law as well as national and su-
pranational courts as opportunity structures for movements to push for change (Hilson, 2002; Wilson, 
2006). In the present analysis, the legal manifestations of the new democratic identity, such as interna-
tional human rights commitments and the enshrinement of a secular interpretation of human rights into 
constitutions and national laws, represent such legal opportunity structures. 
A discursive opportunity structure, on the other hand, refers to the broader ideological context that facil-
itates or constrains successful social movement action (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). The protection of 
human rights as the main ideological framework for legitimate government action in both newly demo-
cratic South Africa and Argentina should help a social movement’s claims resonate with the constitutional 
identity, and be perceived as legitimate. These type of opportunity structures determine the ideas consid-
ered sensible, which constructions of reality are regarded as realistic and which claims are taken as legiti-
mate regarding a policy in each specific moment (ibid., p. 228). With that they are closely related to the 
problem framing, another important concept in the social movement literature. A problem framing de-
fines the legitimate participants of debate and the scope of answers the state can give as well as the bound-
aries of the general debate. 
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From this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings 
that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. Ra-
ther, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance 
of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). 
Therefore, movement actors are involved in what Hall (1982) calls “the politics of signification.” When 
the women’s and LGBT movements in Argentina and South Africa strategically frame their cause as human 
rights matters, the significance of their claims becomes greater than the issues themselves. A successful 
human rights frame is likely to be taken seriously by both the judiciary and legislators; after all what is at 
stake is nothing less than the fledgling democratic identity of the country and the credibility of its legiti-
mising values. 
Thus, the new constitutional identity focused on a secular interpretation of human rights represents ben-
eficial legal and discursive opportunity structures. The institutionalisation of human rights in national law, 
constitutions and international human rights commitments should significantly increase the odds of success 
of legal action undertaken by movement actors. These discursive opportunity structures are equally effec-
tive, as movement actors can frame their claims in a way that resonates with the dominant political dis-
course and the values it entails. Especially the gay rights movement is too small in numbers to have suffi-
cient mobilisation potential. By framing and discursively connecting its struggle with the broader struggles 
of the society, gay rights groups can gain allies in form of the larger, more established human rights groups 
in civil society and independent specialised human rights bodies in government. Framing gay and women’s 
rights as human rights and arguing that a true democracy needs to respect the rights of women and sexual 
minorities, helps to increase social movements’ bargaining clout. This is especially true in the absence of 
a as legitimate perceived religious counter discourse, as the social movement’s framing can become dom-
inant when religious opposition to this framing can be quashed by referencing the immoral relationship 
between the church with the past regime. In other words, the movement actors’ claims have a better 
chance of being acknowledged as rightful when their framing resonates with the country’s constitutional 
identity. In the context of a human rights focused identity, this is easy to achieve for social movement 
actors pushing for policy change and substantially more difficult for religious institutions attempting to 
create a religious frame for the subject. 
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Empirical manifestations 
A test of this section of the mechanism must show that the new constitutional identity has indeed produced 
discursive and legal opportunity structures that can be successfully exploited by social movements. 
The tangibility of legal opportunity structures makes them easier to observe in the empirical reality as the 
discursive structures, which is why a doubly decisive test will suffice for testing the legal aspects of this 
part. International human rights commitments and their incorporation into domestic law should dramat-
ically increase the expected and actual pay-off for social movements to use legal channels to advance their 
causes. Thus, a strong focus for women’s and LGBT rights movements on legal strategies would count as 
evidence of the existence of favourable legal opportunity structures. Moreover, movement actors using 
the judiciary (new constitutions, laws, human rights commitments, courts, constitutional appeal, etc.) to 
advance their cause represents a doubly decisive test for legal opportunity structures, since the absence of 
secularly interpreted human rights in domestic law would not provide a legal basis to take matters to court 
and find a decision in the movement’s favour most unlikely. Also, it is quite certain that actors in favour 
of policy change towards permissiveness use these legal opportunity structures, i.e. go to court to gain 
rights, when they present themselves. Therefore, successful legal action by social movements would 
greatly increase our confidence in the existence of favourable legal opportunity structures. Conversely, 
social movements not using legal channels would count as disconfirming evidence. 
Since matters associated with ideology are notoriously difficult to observe, four empirical tests will be 
conducted to assess the successful exploitation of discursive opportunity structures by social movements. 
The first assesses the movement’s framing itself, while the second focuses on a movement’s reactions to 
the inevitable religious counter discourse on the moral matters under discussion. The third test looks at 
the reception of the movement’s framing by the broader civil society and specialised human rights bodies 
in government. Lastly, the fourth test assesses the congruence between arguments in the reasons for judge-
ments in relevant court cases on the one side, and arguments brought forward by religious institutions and 
women’s and LGBT rights groups on the other. 
A. Social movements’ framing. The new constitutional identity and its associated ideology in-
formed by secularly interpreted human rights create a rhetorical advantage for actors who can frame their 
claims in the language and logic of the nation’s dominant ideological discourse at the time. If social move-
ments make use of this discursive opportunity structure, they should be found to deliberately frame their 
cause as a human rights matter and as an essential component of democracy. Finding such a human rights 
and democracy frame in public communications (such as newspaper ads, websites, publications, banners 
at protests, press releases and so forth) of important women’s and LGBT rights groups would constitute 
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the success of a hoop test. It is quite certain that the presence of favourable discursive opportunity struc-
tures creates a strong incentive for movement actors to use them. On the other hand, the increasing glob-
alisation and transnationalisation of women’s and LGBT rights activism could just as well influence fram-
ing, regardless of local political ideologies. Accordingly, the absence of strategic human rights and democ-
racy framing by social movements would disconfirm this section of the mechanism, while its existence 
only adds minimal confidence at this stage. 
B. Reactions to religious frames. While a new democratic identity focused on a secular inter-
pretation of human rights should create a discursive advantage for women’s and LGBT rights groups, it 
should do the opposite for churches with conservative stances on sexual rights policies. Former alliances 
between religious institutions and authoritarian regimes, combined with a new constitutional identity that 
deemphasises religious principles should make it difficult for the church to frame its claims in a way that 
resonates with the dominant ideologies of the time. Religious challenges to the framing of social move-
ments can be countered by referencing the collusion of the church with the past regime, weakening and 
even delegitimising the church’s claims. Finding that religious arguments are countered by referencing the 
church’s poor human rights record and the illegitimacy of religious influence on policy in the new democ-
racy is as theoretically certain as it is unique. We can conclude that this represents a doubly decisive test. 
We also gain additional confidence in the existence of this section of the mechanism by testing which of 
the competing problem frames (the church’s or the social movements’) is adopted by the broader civil 
society and state institutions, which is the focus of the following two empirical tests. 
C. Human rights bodies support the claims of social movements. An indication of a successful 
human rights framing strategy by LGBT and women’s rights groups is when they gain the explicit support 
of human rights bodies and organisations, such as human rights-based civil society groups or independent 
human rights commissions within the state. Active support in the form of joint marches, petitions, public 
statements in support of the movement’s claims and other lobbying and supportive activities would 
uniquely indicate the acceptance of that framing in the broader civil society and by specialised state agen-
cies. However, this finding is contingent upon the existence of a strong and coordinated civil society 
and/or specific independent state bodies designated for the protection of human rights, which is why 
finding traces of support from human rights bodies represent a smoking gun type of test. In other words, 
such a finding would be quite unique but not certain to be found, and so its absence has no inferential value. 
D. Reasoning of judges. Another smoking gun type evidence could be found in the reasoning 
for verdicts rendered in court cases that deal with the issues subject to this study. If a ruling is justified 
with arguments congruent to the ones brought forward by movements, featuring arguments such as “in 
our democracy religion ought not to impede the realisation of human rights”, this would be unique proof 
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of successful strategic framing by social movements formally embraced by state institutions. However, 
finding such evidence is not certain as deliberations for judgements and verdicts may be authored more 
technically without referencing higher order value systems, like religion. 
In summary, a convincing case for the presence of favourable legal opportunity structures and their causal 
connection to the constitutional identity can be made upon finding that women’s and LGBT rights groups 
successfully employed strategic litigation to further their cause. This includes pushing their claims onto 
the political agenda via constitutional appeal. Empirical indicators of favourable discursive opportunity 
structures include the strategic framing of movement claims as human rights matters and their liberation 
presented as a litmus test for the constitutional identity of the new democracy. Furthermore, the adoption 
of the movement’s framing by human rights organisations, specialised state institutions and in the deliber-
ations of judges would underscore the success of this framing strategy.  
Analogous to the table for the first part of the mechanism, table 12 sums up predicted evidence, test type 
and required data for the second section of the mechanism. 
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3.5 Causal Mechanism Part 3. Parties and Politicians Face Rhetorical Entrapment 
The legislative arena is the final battleground for the passage of policies within democratic systems, which 
is why the third and final missing link of the causal connection focuses on policy makers and their decision 
making in the parliamentary arena. If the preceding elements of the causal mechanism indeed unfolded as 
hypothesised, social movements have not only anchored their claims on the political agenda but the scope 
for acceptable policy design is now limited. In other words, when social movements have successfully 
framed their claims as human rights issues and made full use of the discursive and/or legal opportunity 
structures the post-authoritarian constitutional identity can afford them, parties as well as individual pol-
iticians face rhetorical entrapment that leads to support for permissive sexual rights bills. Even if compet-
ing bills with less far-reaching reforms are on the table, a strongly permissive option will be chosen due 
to the fact that the framing regarding the regulatory status quo is that it violates the human rights of women 
or LGBT people, and a policy that violates human rights somewhat less than the status quo is clearly not a 
feasible option. 
This also helps to explain the noticeable difference in the passage of gay marriage in South Africa and 
Argentina compared with most of their European counterparts; proceeding to fully legalise gay marriage 
without the intermediate step of a civil partnership regime. More precisely, the successful exploitation of 
discursive and/or legal opportunity structures by social movements should each limit the scope of the 
outcome of the policy process in its own way. Regarding the former, a favourable constitutional court 
decision obliges parliament to remedy the declared unconstitutionality of a regulation. Oftentimes judge-
ments can even limit the scope of acceptable political solutions and prescribe components of future poli-
cies, leaving little choice for parliamentary actors but to conform. 
If court decisions leave considerable room for variants of policy design or if strategic litigation is less cen-
tral to a social movement’s strategy, the usage of discursive opportunity structures only can have powerful 
effects on its own. When social movements have successfully presented their cause as an essential test of 
credibility for a constitutional identity based on the protection of human rights, opposition against that 
cause, by other religious or political actors, can simply be disqualified as being opposed to democracy and 
its founding values.  
That is not to say that passing these policies does not involve struggle. It is likely that religious institutions 
still attempt to prevent policy adoption and reframe the issue on more religious grounds. However, when 
given the choice to side with a church disassociated from the democratic constitutional identity, or with 
the credible claims for human rights of an oppressed group, sufficient legislative actors should choose to 
side with social movements. 
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“Rhetorical entrapment” is a concept elaborated by Schimmelfennig (2001) in his work on the European 
Union (EU). Lai (2017) explains that, 
The European community committed rhetorically to the integration of all European countries 
based on their liberal and democratic values, and this rhetorical commitment allowed Central and 
East European states to justify their bids for EU membership claims according to the EU’s essential 
identity: liberal democracy, multilateralism, and unity. The strategic use of rhetorical commit-
ment turned into rhetorical entrapment by highlighting the importance of the EU to honor its 
previous commitment. (Lai, 2017, subsec. 3.2) 
In post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina, political parties and politicians have rhetorically com-
mitted to human rights as a way to stabilise democracy and regain legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community of states. This rhetoric commitment allowed women’s and LGBT rights movements to justify 
their claims for sexual rights on human rights grounds. The strategic human rights framing by social move-
ments turns into rhetorical entrapment for political actors not wanting to undermine the credibility of 
their commitment to constitutionally protected human rights. Once a human rights framing of sexual 
rights is adopted by those with authority “this gradually becomes the guiding framework or rhetorical 
common ground in which actors contest and legitimate the issues” (Hansen, 2006; Lai, 2017, subsec. 3.2). 
Especially in light of the contrasting human rights record of the previous regime, parties most likely do 
not risk to openly oppose reform (and human rights) as it would make them susceptible to the charge of 
hypocrisy. Thus, parties and politicians facing rhetoric entrapment have strong incentives to support per-
missive reform, even against the religious beliefs of their constituents. 
Furthermore, research has shown that even religiously conservative voters care more about pocketbook 
issues rather than morality issues (e.g. Hillygus & Shields, 2005). For example, in South Africa, people 
strongly oppose homosexuality when specifically asked in surveys but do not state homosexuality as a 
priority issue, rather being more concerned with poverty, unemployment and crime (Thoreson, 2008, 
p. 686). The credible commitment to human rights, on the other hand, can be decisive for post-authori-
tarian electoral success. For instance, the surprising victory of Raúl Alfonsín as Argentina’s first demo-
cratic president after the military dictatorship was a result of his clear commitment to human rights (Viola 
& Mainwarning, 1984, p. 38).  
Religiously affiliated parties, such as Christian democratic parties, should not be a hindrance for sexual rights 
policy passage either. That is because not only the roots of party preferences lie in the past, but also of the 
composition of the contemporary party systems. For instance, the formation of Christian democratic parties 
in Western Europe can be traced back to state/church cleavages in the 19th century that triggered a politici-
sation of Catholicism to its defence against a secularising state (Engeli et al., 2012, p. 15; Kalyvas, 1996).  
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This also suggests that cordial relationships between state and church (as prevailed for most of South Af-
rica’s and Argentina’s history) can lead to the absence of strong Christian democratic parties in a country’s 
party system. It follows that, ironically, if churches have enjoyed relatively unchallenged political influence 
in the past, this can leave them without a natural ally in the party system after a political transition of the 
kind that is described in this causal mechanism. If religious parties do form post-democratisation, the 
delegitimation of religious influence on politics should limit their electoral success. This line of reasoning 
is supported by the lack of strong religious parties in South Africa’s and Argentina’s party systems. As 
shown in the previous chapter, after democratisation in South Africa, the ACDP and the UCPD formed 
but were never blessed by electoral success beyond 2 percent of votes, despite the highly religious elec-
torate of the country. 
In summary, I propose that a historically close state/church relationship leaves churches without a natural 
ally in the party system when the ideological links between state and church abruptly change during regime 
transition. This is because the lack of a historical state/church cleavage prevented the formation of reli-
gious parties, and the delegitimation of religious influence on politics prevents them from becoming strong 
in the new democratic present. 
The same reason should limit the incentive of conservative parties without explicit religious ties to con-
form to church demands. Thus, we end in a situation without parties in the party system that are likely to 
make preventing sexual rights policy change a priority. This explains the unlikely success of social move-
ments to have their demands enshrined in policy, despite the initial lack of intention or preference on the 
part of the population, parties or politicians. 
 
Empirical manifestations 
Three empirical tests can deliver evidence for this final theoretical proposition. The first test focuses on 
political parties’ and politician’s actions, while the other two aim to establish which reasons or influences 
are put forward to justify these actions. 
A. Collaboration with social movements. Testing whether women’s and LGBT rights groups’ 
claims are perceived as legitimate concerns by parties and their delegates can be done by observing the 
empirical fingerprints left behind by their active collaboration with such groups. These observations in-
clude joint legislative initiatives, joint press conferences and frequent invitations for movement actors to 
speak at parliamentary committee sessions. Conversely, excluding church leaders would count as evidence 
of politicians becoming increasingly sympathetic to the social movements’ cause. This represents a simple but 
doubly decisive test. In order to increase confidence that legislative actions are indeed influenced by the pre-
ceding components of the mechanism, it is interesting to trace the reasons politicians give for their stances. 
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B. Politicians’ use of a social movement’s framing. If politicians use the framing of human 
rights that has been shaped by the respective social movements, this would count as evidence for their 
actions being influenced by the successful framing strategies of movements. Frame adoption by politicians 
is theoretically certain and unique. It is a unique expression of the causal effect of the movements’ suc-
cessful exploitation of ideological opportunity structures, and its absence would disconfirm this section of 
the mechanism which is why it constitutes a doubly decisive test. 
C. Politicians explicitly reject church influence on public policy. What is equally informative 
in this regard is how religion features in the political debate around the policies in question. If many poli-
ticians chose to adapt the church’s religious frame of the issue, this would count as evidence against this 
section of the mechanism. However, if religion is explicitly invoked as not being a legitimate factor to 
consider for public policy issues, this would constitute smoking gun type evidence. Such evidence would 
uniquely indicate a process of religious delegitimation having taken place, which is key in explaining how 
even numerically strong religious institutions can fail to translate their doctrinal values into public policy. 
However, finding such evidence is not certain as explicitly rejecting religious influence in political state-
ments might increase the moral and political conflict of the debate, therefore politicians may not opt to 
mention religion at all. 
Important empirical material for this section include relevant parliamentary debates, press statements, 
newspaper articles that contain information on parties’ and politicians’ stances on and actions regarding 
the issue under debate and their justifications. As before, table 13 presents an overview on the evidence, 
test types as well as necessary data.
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4 Causal Condition. State/Church Ideological Symbiosis during 
South Africa and Argentina’s last Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Despite different historical and socio-political contexts, both South Africa and Argentina endured violently repressive 
authoritarian regimes in the recent past, indelibly shaping their policies and politics up until the present day. The last 
Argentine military dictatorship, in power from 1976 until democratisation in 1983, is widely accepted as among the 
most repressive in the history of Latin America. The regime waged a ‘dirty war’ [guerra sucia] against its opponents; 
during this period of state terror an estimated number of 30 000 people ‘disappeared’, or abducted by the authorities 
and never heard of or from again (Langer, 2013). The group of disappeared [desaparecidos] consisted mainly of stu-
dents, unionists and any sort of activists, unconcerned in distinguishing between women, men or children (Madres 
de Plaza de Mayo, n.d.). 
Over 300 clandestine detention camps were set up in which political opponents were often raped, tortured and the 
vast majority murdered (ibid.). The victims’ bodies were commonly disposed of in mass graves and those who sur-
vived the torture killed in death flights, that is extrajudicial killings conducted by the military where victims were 
injected with a venom rendering them unconscious, only to be dropped into the ocean from airplanes (Galván, 2013, 
p. 160). This costly method of killing via death flights was financed by robbing these same victims of their belongings, 
conducted as a ‘Christian kind of death’ to assuage the conscience of the militaries who carried out the operation, 
choosing to see God’s ocean as ultimately killing their victims and not themselves (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2017b). 
Based on the personal account of a military official who participated in the killings, an article in the New York Times 
describes the eerie series of events on the death flights: 
Many of the victims were so weak from torture and detention that they had to be helped aboard the plane. 
Once in flight, they were injected with a sedative by an Argentine Navy doctor before two officers stripped 
them and shoved them to their deaths. (Sims, 1995) 
Pregnant women were kept alive in captivity, where they gave birth with hoods over their heads. Many were executed 
shortly after giving birth and their babies given up for adoption by families close to the military (Galván, 2013, p. 160). 
After the end of the dictatorship many military families moved abroad to escape persecution, burdening an almost im-
possible task upon an estimated 500 children and surviving members of their families of ever reuniting as the children 
grew up without knowing their past (ibid.). Thus far (state December 2017), only 126 of these children were identified, 
mainly through the work of the human rights organisation Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo [Grandmothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo] that was formed by the mothers of disappeared who became parents in captivity. The search for the missing 
children via large-scale gene testing in the Argentine population still continues. Despite only having been in power for 
seven years, Argentine society is trying to heal the scars of the past to this day (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2017a).  
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The apartheid regime represents a similar dark episode in South Africa’s history like the military dictatorship in Ar-
gentina, despite the former being in place for a comparatively longer period from 1948 until 1994. In an effort to 
secure white supremacy, the apartheid government implemented strict racial segregation policies, including separate 
designated living areas for different races, entirely separate education systems and public facilities (including segre-
gated public transportation, entrances to buildings, benches on which to sit, areas on the beach, etc.), and the prohi-
bition of “mixed” marriages and inter-racial sexual relations. The government excluded the non-white population 
from almost any direct political participation and severely restricted their movements. Millions of non-whites were 
forcibly removed from their homes all over the country and made to live in designated areas, deprived of basic rights 
and infrastructure. Violence, crime and poverty ran rampant, much of which is still prevalent in many of these areas 
today. More than 80 percent of the country’s territory was reserved for the white minority (which made up only 20 
percent of the population) and individuals classified as non-white required passes to enter. Any form of political 
mobilisation or opposition by non-whites was outlawed and violently oppressed, which also applied to opposition to 
apartheid by white people (Worden, 1994). 
In an effort to discredit the South African regime, the UN declared apartheid a crime in international law in 1973. On 
this occasion, the UN defined apartheid as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them" 
(International Convention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973). Facing increasing iso-
lation internationally, the regime eventually crumbled and the first democratic elections14 were held in 1994. Today, 
the word apartheid [Afrikaans for separateness] is used as a generic label for discriminatory racial segregation worldwide, 
enshrining the aristocracies of the South African regime in everyday language. 
Both the authoritarian apartheid regime in South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina ultimately collapsed 
because their human rights violations led to a loss of legitimacy in the international normative context of human 
rights. That the regimes could stay in power as long as they did in the first place was significantly influenced by their 
ideological symbiosis with the respective main religious institutions, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in South 
Africa and the Catholic Church in Argentina. Both regimes framed the repression they exerted in religious terms, 
gaining credibility through the explicit support of churches15. 
                                                     
14 South Africa had many self-designated “democratic” elections before that but until the end of apartheid, the majority of the 
population was excluded from participating. 
15 It is important to note that both the Catholic Church in Argentina and the DRC in South Africa were not monolithic actors. 
Both institutions also included dissident voices. However, these voices were systematically silenced through repression by the 
regimes and internally by the churches. Since the purpose of this chapter is not a critical appraisal of occasional resistance by 
some within the ranks of the churches but an analysis of the official positions of these institutions as expressed by their ecclesi-
astical hierarchies, the regime opposition by few religious actors will not be further considered. 
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4.1 An Immoral Alliance between State and Church during the last Argentine 
Military Dictatorship 
During the Argentine military dictatorship, religion and nationalism merged to form the ideological un-
derpinnings of the regime. Church and state formed a strong multilevel alliance that had a mutually legit-
imising function for both institutions. The military regime discursively constructed both the national as 
well as its own political identity as Catholic, thereby exploiting religion as a legitimising ideology for its 
rule and ensuing actions. In turn, the Catholic Church in Argentina validated the regimes legitimising 
religious identity through public support for the regime in general, moral support for the military and 
practical support in the implementation of state terror, deeply compromising its moral integrity. 
 
Instrumentalisation of religion by the dictatorship 
Religion was omnipresent in political rhetoric during the dictatorship. In 1976, Argentina was in the midst 
of political chaos related to a guerrilla war between extreme left and right wing militia. That is when a 
military junta overthrew the democratic government “with the help of God”, claiming to lead the country 
on “a quest for the common good, for the full recovery of el ser nacional”, which Feitlowitz (1998, preface, 
1998, p. 24) translates as the collective national essence, soul or consciousness. The discursive construc-
tion of this ser nacional as Christian and as under threat from subversive ‘terrorists’ played an important 
role in the military’s justification for its dirty war against allegedly left-wing minded Argentines. In an 
interview printed in the newspaper La Prensa on the 18th of December 1977, the first leader of the regime, 
Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla, broadly defined terrorists to be not only those carrying weapons 
“but also those who activate, through ideas that stand against our civilisation, other persons.” (General 
Jorge Videla, 1977, my translation). This deliberately open definition of terrorists left space for the inclusion 
of anyone opposing the regime, even if that opposition only included ideas the junta deemed threatening.  
Upon seizing power, the military junta published a document announcing its immediate overtake of the 
government and self-declaring its rule to be a ‘Process of National Reorganisation’ [Proceso de Reorgani-
zación Nacional], a euphemism for the regime’s effort to wipe out the left-wing guerrilla movement. 
“Swearing to God and the Holy Gospels to act with loyalty and patriotism,” the junta declared the Process 
of National Reorganisation to be necessary to reinstitute the “essential values and morality of society and 
eradicate subversion.” (Acta para la Reorganización Nacional del 24 de marzo de 1976, as documented by 
Tronosco, 1984) 
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The junta constructed the national identity being Christian and fundamentally under threat by atheist 
Communism. In that light, the left wing guerrilla movement was not merely a political enemy but repre-
sented the subversion of the Argentine nation itself, significantly raising the stakes of the dirty war. In light 
of this threat, taking extraordinary (and extra-legal) measures seemed more legitimate. Furthermore, 
prescribing a religious essence to the Argentine national identity drew a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
along a strictly religious axis, excluding the subversive other from the definition of Argentineness and also 
from being worthy of state protection (see Barros, 2003).  
A statement by General Videla (1977, my translation) underscores this point: “I want to stress that Ar-
gentine citizens are not victims of repression. The repression is against a minority, who we do not consider 
part of Argentina.” Instrumentalising religion to draw the distinction between us (Catholic) and them 
(atheists) loaded these categories with the simple dichotomies of good vs. evil and morally right vs. morally 
wrong inherent in religious doctrine. Portraying left-wing minded Argentines as the evil other on a quest 
to destroy Argentine Catholic society served as justification for their destruction and rhetorically elevated 
the military operation to the status of a holy mission. The steadfast Catholic faith of the military served as 
proof for the military’s belonging to the us category and for the legitimacy of its rule. 
Magazines and newspaper articles that spread the word of the coup stressed military dictator Videla’s 
deeply held religious beliefs and moral persuasions (Feitlowitz, 1998). The regime subjected the press to 
strict censorship and provided journalists with ‘publication guidelines’ in order to ‘purify’ the public lan-
guage from words associated with subversive ideas (Galván, 2013, p. 158), essentially turning large parts 
of the press into a propaganda machine. Authorised language was only to be related to God, the fatherland 
and home [Dios, Patria, y Hogar] (ibid.). Accordingly, the newspaper La Prensa stated in a front page 
article after the coup that “the people must learn to recognize the ‘civilized’ man who does not know how 
to live in society and who in spite of his appearance and behavior harbors atheist attitudes that leave no 
space for God.” (Feitlowitz, 1998, p. 28; Stockwell, 2014, p. 26) The phrasing of this call for the popu-
lation to ostensibly denounce atheists (really those suspected to have a left-wing political affiliation) is a 
prime example of the religious framing the regime regularly employed for political purposes. 
The religious rhetoric aimed not only at legitimising the military’s rule in the eyes of the population but also 
amongst the military itself. Dictator Videla wrote a book called El Ejército de hoy [The Army of Today], in which 
he expressed his love for the fatherland, Christian principles and the Catholic Church as a spiritual guide. The 
book was recommended reading for members of the military and outlined the armed forces' duty to take charge 
in matters of “ethical purification” and upholding “of the historical-spiritual values” of the nation (Verbitsky, 
2012, p. 3). A passage of an interview with church official Padre Bernado conducted by Marchak and Marchak 
(1999) serves as an illustration of the Christian self-perception of the armed forces during the dictatorship: 
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[T]hey were convinced that they were the moral reserve of the country against communism, which 
was seen as the destruction of the nation. And above all – another sin of our western and Christian 
culture – communism is against our style of life as Christians, you see? So they took the flag of the 
country and of religion. If you want to be military, you must be baptised. (Padre Bernado in Marchak 
& Marchak, 1999, p. 264) 
In the aftermath of the coup, numerous members of the military stated that it was not easy for them to 
carry out the orders of the regime. As a result, so indicated members of the armed forces interviewed by 
Mallimaci (2012, p. 180, my translation), “they needed, asked for and obtained the ‘blessing’ of a priest 
who ‘sent’ them and authorised this just and holy mission to kill to ‘remedy’ the malaise of society.” This 
underlines the central role played by church and faith to act as the supreme moral authority, legitimising 
state violence (ibid.). The testimonies given by victims in the context of the first human rights report 
uncovering the abuses of the dictatorship, called Nunca Más [Never Again], published after the return to 
democracy, reveal how the regime’s discursive construction of the us vs. them binary played out in the 
concrete implementation of state terror on the ground. Compelled to act in the name of God, soldiers 
forced victims to recite Christian texts while being tortured. “They told us we were devils”; “they are 
atheists, children of the devil”; “if you did not know how to recite the Our Father’s prayer they hit you”; 
“if you were a Jew, they tortured you double for being subversive and for being a Jew.” (Argentina, 1986)  
How can the military have been so convinced to be on a holy mission according to the will of God? The 
answer lies in the institutional support from the Catholic Church that validated the religious framing of 
the regime’s identity and morally approved of the military’s holy mission. Arguably, without the church’s 
support the sacralisation of politics during the military dictatorship would not have been as persuasive; 
only the church’s active support for the regime justifies classifying the relationship of the dictatorship and 
Catholic Church as an ideological symbiosis. 
 
Church support for the regime 
The intersection between state and Catholicism in the Argentine dictatorship went far beyond the regime’s 
rhetorical exploitation of religion. The two institutions formed a veritable entente with committed par-
ticipation on the side of the church. Church support for the regime can be broken down into three com-
ponents: public support for the regime, moral support for the military and practical support in the imple-
mentation of state terror. 
Historically, the Argentine episcopacy has chosen to ally with the military and consequently oppose de-
mocracy. Past experience of losing influence in Argentine society during earlier attempts at democracy in 
the 19th century informed the church’s desire to collude with military interests to defend its privileged 
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position in Argentine society (Marchak & Marchak, 1999, p. 253). Apart from a short struggle with then-
president Peron in 1954-55, Catholic Church leaders regularly engaged in “cordial relations with whatever 
government was in power, concentrating their efforts on guaranteeing control over Argentine culture by 
legal decree. This policy led the vast majority of church officials to endorse (…) the most recent authori-
tarian government” (Gill, 1998, p. 149). Even though the Catholic Church‘s support for the regime is 
well documented, the church has long denied responsibility and only in 2012 (thirty years after the end of 
the dictatorship), was there a collective apology from the Argentine bishops about the failures of the 
church in the dirty war (Langer, 2013). However, the church only admitted to fault by omission, i.e. 
claiming to only not having actively opposed the regime. Furthermore, despite ample evidence to the 
contrary, church officials have steadfastly claimed not having known about the human rights abuses. 
Amongst the evidence for the church’s active support for the regime is that the night before as well as on 
the day of the 1976 military coup, both church and military leaders met to discuss the immediate future 
of the country. After the coup, Archbishop Adolfo Tortolo, who was president of the Bishop’s Conference 
as well as vicar of the armed forces, publicly called for the Argentine people to “cooperate in a positive 
way” with the new military dictatorship, increasing the legitimacy of the military overthrow (Mignone, 
1986, p. 2). Still convinced of the righteousness of the dirty war, ex-General Videla gave a series of inter-
views16 to newspapers in 2010 (which were only published in 2012), in which he revealed that he had 
many conversations about the dirty war with Cardinal Raúl Francisco Primatesta during the time of the 
military regime. Conversations also supposedly took place with other leaders of the Argentine episcopal 
conference and with Pio Laghi, the papal nuncio at the time. “They advised us about the manner in which 
to deal with the situation” (Jorge Videla 2010, as quoted in Mercopress, 2012). 
At the time, the symbiosis with the regime proved to be beneficial for the church as it maintained its 
influence in the education system, secured privileged access to the media and enjoyed an increased state 
support by the Junta in the form of pension plans and monthly salaries for bishops (Fabris, 2012). In return, 
the church had to pay the price of covering up the immoral behaviour of the regime and deeply compro-
mising its moral integrity by actively participating in the regimes inhumane practices. For example, then-
Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Juan Carlos Aramburu, denied the severe human rights abuses of the regime 
and repeatedly repudiated the fact that countless political opponents disappeared. In the same vein, six 
month after the coup, Archbishop Tortolo told the press: “I have no knowledge, I have no reliable proof, 
of human rights being violated in this country” (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, p. 38). However, an entry in 
                                                     
16 While sentenced to a lifetime in prison after the dictatorship during the Alfonsín administration, military leaders were later 
pardoned later by president Ménem, enabling Videla to give these interviews as a free man. That pardon was subsequently 
reversed under the Kirchner administration, and Videla died in prison. 
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the personal diary of vicar Mons. Bonamín at the time suggests otherwise. The diary states that Bonamín 
consulted with Tortolo (as president of the Bishop’s conference the relevant authority for such matters) 
about the moral dilemma felt by the soldiers while carrying out torture programmes. Tortolo recom-
mended establishing criteria for legitimate torture under Catholic morality. His reasoning was that since 
the death penalty can be justified in the Catholic moral code, so can torture as it is less harmful than the 
former (Mallimaci, 2012, p. 175).  
Not only individuals among the ranks of the church hierarchy were supportive of the regime and its prac-
tices. In one of the first public statements by bishops as a group in 1977, they legitimised the military rule 
and justified repressions, stating: “We are aware of the threat to national life that subversion has meant 
and continues to mean. We understand that those who are responsible for the welfare of the country have 
found it necessary to take extraordinary measures.” (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, p. 38, emphasis added) 
Apart from the ecclesiastical hierarchy being closely connected to the military leaders, lower rank church 
officials played an important role in the implementation of the regime’s practices. Argentina’s National 
Commission On The Disappeared revealed the direct participation of clergymen in extra-legal abductions, 
tortures and killings undertaken by the regime. In clandestine detention camps, clergy supported the mil-
itary by encouraging prisoners to confess in order to avoid additional torture (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, 
p. 38). In a participant testimony captured in Nunca Más, a former police officer testified that after being 
involved in the brutal extra-legal execution of three regime opponents, he was comforted by church offi-
cial Father Von Wernich. The latter told him that what he had done “was necessary; it was a patriotic act 
and God knew it was good for the country” (Testimony of Julio Alberto Emmed, file No. 683 in Nunca 
Más, Argentina, 1986). Church officials convinced the police and military that their actions constituted a 
holy duty and played a pivotal role in creating the ideological blindness of the state apparatus necessary for 
large-scale state terrorism. 
Having realised that ideological symbiosis with the regime brought only short-term advantages, the church 
has denied active involvement with the regime until this day. Especially considering the mounting allega-
tions against the current Pope (Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, now Pope Francis I) concerning his in-
volvement with the regime, it seems unlikely that it will ever be in the Catholic Church’s interest to 
investigate its role in the dictatorship. Despite the church’s opportunistic denial, the immoral alliance of 
the church and the military regime did not go unnoticed in Argentine society and severely damaged the 
church’s moral authority for the decades to come. 
  
